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Constitutional Criminal Procedure
by James P. Fleissner
Sarah B. Mabery*'

and
Jeanne L. Wiggins**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys noteworthy 2000 decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in the field commonly known
as Constitutional Criminal Procedure. As in past years, the survey
focuses on significant decisions concerning the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, prohibition against
double jeopardy, and guarantees of due process and grand jury
screening; and the Sixth Amendment's procedural protections, including
the right to counsel and the right of confrontation. Of course, most of
these rights, with few exceptions, such as the right to have charges
approved by a grand jury, have been held applicable to state criminal
justice systems pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a very busy appellate court, the Eleventh Circuit hears
a large number of direct appeals and collateral proceedings that raise
issues of the proper scope of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
This Article endeavors to identify the most significant of those decisions
from 2000, summarize the cases and the court's reasoning, and provide
a measure of context and commentary as to the issues presented.

* Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Marquette
University (B.A., 1979); University of Chicago Law School (J.D., 1986).
** Flagler College (B.A., 1997); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University
(J.D., magna cum laude, 2001).
*** Tennessee Wesleyan College (B.A., 1997); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University (J.D., cum laude, 2001).

1305

1306

MERCER LAW REVIEW

II.

[Vol. 52

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'

Investigatory Stop and Frisk
The court of appeals decided several stop and frisk cases during the
survey period. In United States v. Smith,2 the Eleventh Circuit
confronted the now routine practice of drug interdiction officers who lack
reasonable suspicion that any passenger is carrying drugs: checking bus
passengers for drugs by seeking their consent to search.3 Aggressive
law enforcement agents capitalize on the realities of the crowded bus,
where passengers may be unable to disembark and may feel constrained
to cooperate because of the appearance that refusal would create for the
officers and other passengers. In the crowded environment of a bus,
where the passengers often lack the option of walking away from the
officers, courts have the difficult task of assessing whether a reasonable
bus passenger would feel free not to cooperate or whether the encounters
constitute a Terry seizure, which is unlawful when not based on
reasonable suspicion. Of course, if the encounters amounted to an illegal
Fourth Amendment seizure, consent given by a passenger to search
luggage is vitiated, and any evidence found must be suppressed.
In Smith the court examined the following issues: (1) whether the
bus check was a seizure; and (2) whether the seizure was reasonable.4
The court held that while the bus check amounted to a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, the seizure was reasonable and, therefore, the
evidence was properly admitted at trial.' The agents in this case were
conducting surveillance for drug activity on May 5, 1997. The agents
noticed defendant engage in a quick whispered conversation with
Bruton, another man in the terminal the agents had been watching.
Bruton had appeared nervous, was constantly changing seats, and
watched passengers as they walked through the terminal. The agents
had also been watching two new, expensive looking suitcases left
A.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 201 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2000).
3. Id. at 1319.
4.
5.

Id. at 1322-23.
Id. at 1323.
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unattended in the terminal. Bruton later boarded a bus with the
previously unattended luggage, after sliding one piece of the luggage to
defendant to carry onto the bus. The agents then followed the suspects
to the bus. After the two suspects deposited the luggage in the
undercarriage of the bus, the agents examined the luggage and noted it
belonged to a Mr. Pender. The agents then requested permission of the
driver to conduct a bus check.'
The agents boarded the bus and announced to the passengers that
they were conducting a "routine public transportation safety check."7
They were in plain clothes, had their weapons concealed, but did show
their badges as they boarded the bus. The agents then requested as part
of the check that the passengers show their ticket, photo identification,
and identify which bags belonged to them on the bus. They would
approach each passenger, stand behind the passenger so as not to block
the aisle, and ask if the passenger was carrying drugs, weapons, or large
amounts of money. Both defendant and Bruton denied carrying drugs
or weapons and denied they had checked luggage. The officers then
produced the suspicious baggage tagged as belonging to Mr. Pender and
asked if it belonged to anyone on the bus. Defendant and Bruton denied
ownership of the luggage. The officers opened the luggage and found
eleven kilograms of cocaine. Both Bruton and defendant were arrested.'
The court first examined whether the bus check was a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.9 "[Tihe crucial test is whether, taking into
account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police
conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business."" The court determined that its recent opinion in another bus
sweep case, United States v. Washington11 controlled as there was no

6. Id. at 1320.
7. Id. The agents gave the following announcement:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, my partner and I are both federal agents of
the United States Department of Justice. Nobody is under arrest or anything like
that, we're just conducting a routine public transportation safety check. When we
get to you, if you would please show us your bus ticket, some photo identification,
if you have some with you, please. And, most importantly, if you would identify
which bags are yours on the bus, we'd appreciate it, and we'll be out of your way
real quick.

Id.
8. Id. at 1320-21. Both defendants had one-way tickets from Miami, Florida to
Charleston, South Carolina. Id. at 1320. A bus ticket with the name of Pender on it was
also found in a seat near defendant and Bruton after they were arrested. Id. at 1321.
9. Id. at 1321.
10. Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostic, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)).
11. 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998).
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material distinction between Washington and the present case.' 2 In
fact, the court noted that the bus check in Washington was conducted in
an almost identical manner, and the very same agents were involved in
both cases. 3 Critically, the agents in Washington and Smith did not
inform the passenger that they had a right to refuse to cooperate.
Therefore, the court14 concluded that the bus check in this case did
constitute a seizure.

However, the inquiry did not end there. The court then examined the
issue of whether the seizure was reasonable. 5 On this issue, the court
held that "the totality of the circumstances created a reasonable
suspicion that defendant and Bruton were engaged in criminal activity." The court began this inquiry by articulating the general rule that
detention, if "brief and minimally intrusive," is permissible if there is
reasonable suspicion that a crime has or is about to take place. 7 The
court analyzed defendant's behavior at the bus terminal and the agents'
experience in the field of investigating narcotics and held that reasonable suspicion existed. 8 The evidence the court considered important
in creating reasonable suspicion was the nervousness of defendant and
Bruton, the whispered conversation, the suitcases and attendant conduct
regarding the suitcases, and the origination of the suitcases in Miami. 19
The court held the detention and minimal intrusion on the bus was
therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.2 ° Although not
discussed by the court, the suspicious and untrue responses given during
the seizure gave the officers probable cause to search the suitcases."
Another case in which the Eleventh Circuit examined the reasonableness of a Terry stop involved a defendant who was detained for seventyfive minutes while the agents searched the residence of defendant and
her husband.22 In United States v. Gil,2 " the Eleventh Circuit held
valid a seventy-five minute detention of defendant as a legitimate Terry

12. 201 F.3d at 1322. For an extended examination of Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, see
James P. Fleissner & Jeffrey R. Harris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Two Year
Survey, 50 MERCER L. REV. 921, 936-37 (1999).
13. 201 F.3d at 1321.
14. Id. at 1322.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1323.
17. Id. at 1322 n.8.
18. Id. at 1323.
19. Id. The court also noted the attempt by defendant and Bruton to hide the fact that
they were traveling together. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2000).
23. 204 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2000).
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stop lasting until probable cause for her arrest could be obtained by
searching defendant's residence.24 Defendant's husband, Julian Gil,
arranged to buy twenty kilograms of cocaine from a confidential
informant. As part of this arrangement, Julian procured five of the
kilograms to take back to his home for testing before purchasing the
remainder. The residence was under surveillance at this time, and
defendant was seen leaving the residence fifteen minutes later with two
plastic bags. The agents stopped defendant several blocks from her
home. Defendant consented to a search of the car and the bags; fruit
and $12,500 were found. Defendant was then placed in an agent's
vehicle and returned to the residence only after the residence was
secured. At that point, defendant was formally arrested.25
The main issue in this case concerned the length and circumstances
of the detention prior to defendant's arrest. Defendant argued that
because she was held seventy-five minutes and was placed in handcuffs
in an agent's car, her detainment constituted a full arrest and not a
Terry stop.2" The court first articulated the standard to be used in
evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry stop as whether, considering
the "totality of the circumstances," it "'was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.'"27 The court then cited several factors that are relevant in this
determination, including the "'purposes served by the detention, the
diligence with which the police pursue the investigation, the scope and
intrusiveness of the detention, and the duration of the detention.'"2 8
The court first noted that the agents only detained defendant to prevent
jeopardizing the investigation of the residence and then only as long as
was necessary to complete that investigation.2" The court, therefore,
determined there was sufficient evidence to support detention under the
first two factors.3 ° The court then turned to the scope and intensity of
the detention and found that while the detention was intrusive in that
defendant was handcuffed in the agent's car, this was reasonable under
the circumstances to "maintain the safety of the officers and the ongoing
investigation of the residence."3" The court emphasized that because
there was no female officer present, the agents did not search defendant

24. Id. at 1350.
25. Id. at 1349. Defendant originally denied knowing anything about the money, but
admitted during this detention that the money belonged to her husband. Id.
26. Id. at 1350-51.
27. Id. at 1351 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985)).
28. Id. (quoting United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 1988)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1310

[Vol. 52

for weapons, which necessitated the intensity of the detention.3 2 The
court did not really focus on the fact that the detention lasted seventyfive minutes but instead referenced the length of the detention by noting
33
that the detention, including the length of time, was reasonable.
Interestingly, the court noted in a footnote that under these facts,
probable cause for arrest existed after the officers discovered the money
in the vehicle, so even if the seizure was illegal under Terry, the seizure
of Ms. Gil was still lawful.34 In any event, the court's conclusion that
there was probable cause was an unnecessary alternative basis for the
decision because the court held the Terry stop reasonable. 35 Terry
standards do not set rigid time limits or a strict "least instrusive means"
test, and Gil demonstrates how the fluidity of the standards allow for
steady expansion of the scope of the stop and frisk authority. When the
party with standing to contest the stop is caught red-handed with illegal
drugs, it is hardly surprising that over time there is an inexorable
expansion of the authority of agents to seize persons for the purpose of
investigation.
The Eleventh Circuit examined another case this year addressing both
reasonable suspicion and probable cause. In United States v. Gordon,3

defendant and three co-defendants were convicted of robbery and gun
charges. The robbery occurred on May 6, 1998, at a military surplus
store. The clerk in the store was beaten and left handcuffed in a rear
room as a result of the robbery. The defendant and his co-defendants
were subsequently arrested for loitering, as a result of which the police
discovered evidence of the robbery.3" The initial stop of defendant and
his co-defendants occurred in an area of Miami consisting mostly of
abandoned buildings and considered a suspect area for drugs. The
officers approached defendants, who reacted suspiciously, according to
the officers. Three of the men had been standing outside and behind the

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1350 n.2. The court said specifically:
Although we need not decide this issue because we hold that the Terry stop was
reasonable, the facts support a finding that could have been made by the trial
court that the police had probable cause to arrest Ms. Gil at the time that they
discovered the bag containing $12,500 in her car.
Id.
35.

Id.

36. 231 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 2000).
37. Id. at 752-53. The evidence of the robbery found in defendants' car consisted of four
loaded magazine clips, a flack jacket, several boxes of bullets, a gun case, and a ski mask.
Defendant Jackson was identified as one of the assailants from the robbery after this
evidence was found. Id. at 753.
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vehicle. After they saw the officers, they quickly got into the vehicle. 38
The officers decided to stop the vehicle because they believed the men
were violating Florida's anti-loitering statute. The officers stopped the
vehicle and saw several loaded magazine clips in plain view in the back
seat. Defendants gave inconsistent statements about what they were
doing in the area. Based upon these circumstances, the officers arrested
the men, searched the car, and found evidence inculpating defendants
with respect to the robbery.39
The court began its analysis by examining the current law governing
reasonable suspicion under Illinois v. Wardlow,4° a relatively recent
case from the Supreme Court in which a person's headlong flight from
police in a high crime area was held to constitute reasonable suspicion.
Under Wardlow, an officer may make a brief investigatory stop "'when
the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot.'""' The court further explained that the officer must be able
to articulate this suspicion and cannot rely upon a hunch.42 The court
then explained that this suspicion "may be formed by observing
exclusively legal activity."4 3 The court concluded that the facts in
Gordon were very similar to those in Wardlow."
The court reasoned that defendant's presence in a high crime area,
along with evidence of flight, was sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion.4 5 The court emphasized defendant's flight as the determining factor.46 The court explained that "'[headlong flight-wherever it
occurs-is the consummate act of evasion: [Ilt is not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such."' 7 The
court noted that defendant's location in a high crime area near
abandoned buildings alone would not have established reasonable
suspicion.48 However, the court found the "critical additional fact in
this case [to be] the Defendant's flight."49 Defendant, however, argued
that his flight was different from defendant's in Wardlow because it was

38. Id. at 755. The officers said the men "resembled deer staring into an automobile's
headlights." Id.
39. Id.
40. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
41. Gordon, 231 F.3d at 754 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123).
42. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
43. Id. (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25; Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23).
44. Id. at 756.
45. Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124).
Id.
Id.
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not headlong flight."° The court reasoned that the key question is not
whether flight is headlong, but "whether the flight is unprovoked."5
The court held that flight provoked by the officers in this case rose to the
level of reasonable suspicion regardless of whether it was headlong.52
The court explained that
[o]bviously the speed of the suspect's movements may be relevant in
the totality of the circumstances, but the fact that the suspect walked
very quickly, as opposed to ran, away from the spot where he was
sighted by police does not itself change the analysis where it is evident
from the circumstances that he was attempting to flee upon sighting
the police. 3
The court's focus, as noted in a footnote, was the suspect's attempt to
"'evade the officer."'5 4 Therefore the court held that reasonable
suspicion existed and the investigatory stop was permissible."
The decision in Gordon prompts two comments. First, it illustrates
the ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in Wardlow, a 5-4
decision that surely is the low water mark among the Court's reasonable
suspicion cases. Wardlow can be broadly read to hold that headlong
flight from police in a high crime area equals reasonable suspicion.5
The court in Gordon reads Wardlow as focusing on the unprovoked
nature of the flight, arguably diluting the reasonable suspicion standard
even further. The second point is to note the role of the loitering statute
in the court's analysis. Setting aside potential constitutional issues,"
statutes that criminalize loitering are tempting vehicles for justifying an
initial seizure for purposes of further investigation of other crimes.
Because police are allowed to make pretextual stops," loitering
statutes, like the motor vehicle codes, provide police with sweeping
ability to stop individuals they suspect of other crimes. The court in

50. Id. at 756-57. Defendants entered the car quickly and left. Id. at 754.
51. Id. at 757 (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124); The court noted specifically with
regard to unprovoked flight:

[Uinprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very
nature, is not "going about one's business"; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing
officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is

quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his business.
Id. at 756 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125).
52. Id.
53.
54.

Id. (citing United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Id. at 756 n.3 (quoting Briggman, 931 F.2d at 709).

55. Id. at 758.
56. See id. at 757-58.
57.
58.

See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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Gordon had little trouble finding that the officers did indeed have
probable cause that the loitering statute was being violated, as is
discussed further below.
The Eleventh Circuit examined another case, United States v.
Powell,59 to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists when a
suspect is seen leaving the residence of a known drug trafficker for a
second time within a brief period. 60 Defendant and her passenger
visited the residence of a known drug dealer while it was under
surveillance. Defendant went into the garage carrying a backpack,
spoke with someone, and left the garage still carrying the backpack.
Defendant then got into the passenger seat of the car, and the passenger
drove around a while. The officers followed them. Defendant and her
passenger returned to the residence without making any stops.
Defendant went into the garage a second time and emerged without the
backpack. She did not appear to be carrying anything when she left.
Officers then followed the car and stopped defendant. After defendant
gave consent to search, officers found $12,850 in cash. The entire stop
and search lasted about forty minutes. Defendant also made several
statements concerning the money during the stop. The district court
granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence and statements and the
government appealed.61
The court held that the "totality of the circumstances justified the
officers' reasonable suspicion that something related to drug trafficking
had occurred."62 The court reasoned that, while each activity may seem
ambiguous and innocent alone, "'they are each relevant in the determination of whether the agents had reasonable suspicion to stop [defendant].'" 3 The court found significant the fact that the officers did not
stop defendant when she first went into the garage with the backpack,
came outside, switched seats with her passenger and then left.64 The
officers did not stop defendant until she had returned, went back in, and
came out without the backpack.6" Further, the court analogized this
case to United States v. Glinton.6 6 There, the court noted that one
appropriate consideration in finding reasonable suspicion was that
defendant carried a bag into and out of a known drug house.67

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

222 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 916.
Id. at 915-16.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 918 (quoting United States v. Cruz, 909 F.2d 422, 424 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Id.
Id.
154 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1257.
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Therefore, the court concluded that the stop in Powell was appropriate. 8
B.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Standing
In United States v. Cooper,69 the court examined whether defendants
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room that they did not
register or pay for, but nonetheless occupied.70 Two different individuals, Garcia and Gonzalez, registered for two rooms directly across from
one another at a hotel in Orlando, Florida on January 26, 1997.
Defendants were then seen entering and leaving these rooms, although
they were not the guests registered to these rooms. One morning, the
guests in an adjoining room complained of a ringing alarm clock, and a
security officer went to one of the rooms used by defendants. The
security officer did not get a response when he knocked, and he entered
the room to stop the clock. The officer saw marijuana in plain view and
immediately notified local law enforcement. The security officer opened
the room for the police and gave the consent to search. The officers then
waited in an adjoining room for defendants to return and then arrested
them. Defendants filed motions to suppress based upon the warrantless
search of the hotel room alleging it was invalid because there was
neither valid consent to search nor exigent circumstances. The district
court denied the motions on the ground that defendants had no
expectation of privacy in a hotel room.'
The court first noted that defendants must meet a threshold inquiry
by establishing, through their motions to suppress, that they indeed had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room.72 The court
explained that several factors are used to determine whether an
individual has an expectation of privacy in such a room. 3 These
factors include "whether the individual paid and/or registered for the
room or whether the individual's personal belongings were found inside
the room."7 4 The court noted that defendants' motions to suppress did
not meet the standard necessary to establish a reasonable expectation

68. 222 F.3d at 918.
69. 203 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 1282.
71. Id. at 1282-83. The court also declined to grant defendants an evidentiary hearing
on their motion to suppress. Id.
72. Id. at 1284 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.1 (1978); United States v.
Sneed, 732 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir. 1984)).
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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of privacy because it did not allege either of these factors. 5 The court
emphasized that "'[a] motion to suppress must in every critical respect
be sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable
the court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented ....

A court

need not act upon general or conclusory assertions."'7 6 The court found
that defendants' motions to suppress were conclusory and not based
upon specific facts demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy.77
Defendants attempted to argue that they were overnight guests of
Gonzalez and under Minnesota v. Olson7" were, therefore, entitled to
reasonable expectation of privacy.79 The court declined to decide the
issue because defendants did not allege this in their motions to suppress. 0 The court then held that defendants had no expectation of
privacy in the hotel room and therefore lacked standing to challenge the
search of the room.8 '
Defendants appealed the district court's refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing on the standing issue. Defendants argued that a hearing was
necessary to properly demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the hotel room. 2 The court pointed to precedent and held that
where a defendant in a motion to suppress fails to allege facts that if
proved would require the grant of relief, the law does not require that
the district court hold a hearing independent of the trial to receive
evidence on any issue necessary to the determination of the motion. 8

The court concluded that because defendants' motions were "wholly
lacking in sufficient factual allegations to establish standing," they were
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 4

75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985)).
77. Id. at 1285.
78. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
79. 203 F.3d at 1284.
80. Id. at 1285. Specifically, the court noted that "[tlo now allow Defendants to
supplement their motion to suppress with new factual allegations on appeal would
undermine the requirement enunciated in Richardson that motions to suppress be 'definite,
specific, detailed, and nonconjectural' when considered by the district court." Id. (quoting
Richardson, 764 F.2d at 1527).
81. Id.
82. Id. Defendants argued that they could have shown a reasonable expectation of
privacy if they had been granted the hearing. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Sneed, 732 F.2d at 888).
84. Id.
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C. ProbableCause and Arrest
The Eleventh Circuit also examined a case on interlocutory appeal by
the government in United States v.Bervaldi,"5 which presented the
question of whether evidence seized from defendant's home should have
been suppressed because officers entered the home on the authority of
an arrest warrant for a person other than defendant."s The court held
that because the officers reasonably believed that both the residence
entered was the residence of the named suspect in the warrant and that
the suspect was actually in the residence, their entry did not constitute
an invalid search under the Fourth Amendment."7 On March 10, 1998,
several officers arrived at the home of defendant to execute an arrest
warrant for a man named Bennett Deridder. The officers knocked
several times and defendant came to the door. The officers identified
themselves as the police and defendant slammed the door shut. At this
point, the officers kicked the door in and entered the house. Upon entry,
the officers realized defendant was not Deridder. A gun was found lying
in plain view not far from the door, and the officers did a protective
sweep of the house to determine if Deridder or any harm other than the
gun was present. During the protective search, the officers noticed a
strong odor of marijuana. The officers informed defendant of his
Miranda rights and questioned him about the odor. Defendant then
showed the officers some marijuana. The officers asked defendant for
consent to search, and defendant consented but would not sign a consent
form, causing some of the officers to leave the residence to seek a search
warrant. When the officers returned and executed the warrant, more
than sixty pounds of marijuana, among other things, was seized from
defendant's home.8" The district court granted defendant's motion to
suppress based upon the finding that "the officers could not have
reasonably believed that Deridder resided at the [defendant's house], but
that had they reasonably believed that this was his residence, then they
could have reasonably believed that Deridder was at the house when
they entered it." 9
The magistrate judge, whose recommendation the district court
adopted, based this conclusion on the evidence the officers presented
about how they determined that Deridder lived at defendant's residence.

85.

226 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000).

86. Id. at 1258.
87. Id. at 1267.
88. Id. at 1258-59. Defendant was kept in custody and not arrested until later that
evening. Id. at 1259.
89. Id. at 1262.
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The officers first identified the vehicle driven by Deridder from a traffic
citation. From there, the officers obtained an address. The vehicle was
registered to Betty Spatten who then lived at the address later occupied
by defendant. The officers had seen Deridder leaving this residence in
the vehicle registered to Spatten. The officers later attempted to obtain
a voice identification by approaching Deridder and asking him where he
lived. Deridder provided two addresses when questioned. One address
he identified as his parents' home and the other as his own residence.
He identified defendant's address as his residence at the time. The
officers also testified about several database queries made by the officers
on computer systems databases, including: a highway safety database,
a real estate database, drivers license records, and arrest records.
Several of the databases listed defendant's address as that of Deridder
for various periods of time. Other databases listed other addresses.
Some of the databases showed periods of residency for Deridder as
ending in 1997. The officers testified that Deridder's parents' address
was often used for records but that he was actually believed to reside at
defendant's address. 90
Defendant also offered evidence to show Deridder could not reasonably
be believed to have lived at defendant's address at the time. Defendant
introduced evidence including the testimony of a private investigator
about the databases used by the police, a warranty deed indicating the
sale of the property, water bills, and telephone bills.9'
The Eleventh Circuit began the analysis with the now familiar
standard from Payton v. New York 92 that although warrantless
searches and seizures made inside the home are presumptively
unreasonable, "'an arrest warrant founded on probably cause implicitly
carries with it limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect
lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within."'93 The
court then articulated the two-step analysis that must be undertaken in
the warrantless search of a home. 94 "[Flirst, there must be a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect's dwelling, and
second, the police must have reason to believe that the suspect is within
the dwelling."9" The court then held that "common sense factors"

90. Id. at 1259-61.
91. Id. at 1261. The private investigator noted that the database used by the police
was not particularly reliable and that a "Dossier" search would have been more
"expansive." Id.
92. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
93. 226 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 603).
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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indicating residency are appropriate in these cases."6 As to the first
prong, the court considered the "common sense factor" that it is not
uncommon for people in their twenties to use their parents address as
a permanent address for purposes of records only when they do not
actually reside there.9 7 Based upon this common sense factor and the
officers' observations and testimony, the court concluded that it was
reasonable for the officers to believe that Deridder actually resided at
defendant's address at the time they executed the warrant.9"
However, the court held that to meet the first prong of the test, the
officers also had to have reasonably believed that Deridder still lived at
defendant's residence at the time they executed the warrant, absent
additional evidence and the passage of time. 9 The court noted as
particularly important the officers' testimony that Deridder was seen
leaving defendant's residence as late as August of 1997.100 The court
also reasoned that evidence from the databases that linked Deridder to
defendant's address as late as August of 1997 supported this belief.''
Based upon these facts, the court concluded that the officers' belief that
Deridder was residing at defendant's address in August 1997 was
reasonable. 102
The court then stated that the information must be timely; in other
10 3
words, the warrant could not be supported by stale information.
The court pointed out that "[a]lthough reasonable belief is different than
probable cause [the] staleness doctrine [is] instructive here."0 4 The
court emphasized that the nature of the crime is an important factor in
determining whether information in a warrant is stale. 1 5 Another
factor the court considered was that when an "'affidavit recites activity
indicating protracted or continuous conduct, time is of less significance.' ' 106 The court listed several other factors to consider when
examining the issue of staleness, including the following: "habits of the

96. Id. (citing Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535).
97. Id. The court gave the example of the common practice of university students
retaining their parents address as a permanent address for purposes of records. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1264.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1265 (internal citations omitted). The court cited and quoted several cases
applying the staleness doctrine to probable cause supporting a warrant and concluded that

this doctrine also applies to reasonable belief required to support a warrant. Id. at 126465.
105. Id. at 1265 (citing United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 450 (11th Cir. 1994)).
106. Id. (quoting United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1984)).
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accused, character of the items sought, and nature and function of the
premises to be searched."' The court then examined the present case
in light of these factors and reasoned that residency in a home is a fairly
permanent condition, or at least "not transitory."' ° Finally, the court
held, without applying a specific time limit, that it was reasonable for
the officers to believe that Deridder still lived at defendant's address six
months after last having information to that effect.' 0 9
The court then turned to the presence of information gained during
this six-month period and the effect it had on the reasonableness of the
officers' belief."0 The court looked at the intervening evidence to
determine whether it "eroded the reasonable belief' of the officers
concerning the residency of Deridder."' The officers saw a for sale
sign during that six-month period that they did not see when they
returned to execute the warrant." 2 The court found that because the
officers did not notice the sign missing during the predawn execution of
the warrant, the significance of its absence did not make the officers'
belief unreasonable."' As for other information that defendant argued
could have been obtained during this period, including bill records and
property records, the court concluded that "the officers, in light of the
information they already had, were [not] constitutionally obligated to
check these records."" 4 The court then held that the officers had a
reasonable belief that Deridder resided at defendant's address during the
period the warrant was executed."'
The court then examined whether the officers reasonably believed that
Deridder was present at the precise time the warrant was executed."'
The court noted three factors supporting a reasonable belief by the
officers that Deridder was present: (1) the early morning hour; (2) the
vehicles parked in the driveway; and (3) the officers' belief that it was

107. Id. (quoting Harris, 20 F.3d at 450).
108. Id.
109. Id. The court noted that in precedent, information 11 months old was held
sufficient to support probable cause because the activities were "protracted and ongoing."
Id. at 1266 (citing United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 735-36 (11th Cir. 1991)).
110. Id. at 1265-66.
111. Id. at 1266.
112. Id. During this period that the officers saw the for sale sign, they also did not see
Derrider's vehicle at the residence, nor Derrider enter or leave the residence. Id.
113. Id. The court noted that the focus was on what the officers noticed, not what was
actually present. Id. (citing Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535).
114. Id. at 1267.
115. Id.
116. Id.

1320

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Deridder who answered the door.'17 The court held that the officers'
belief that Deridder was actually at the residence was reasonable;
therefore, the entry into the residence did not violate the Fourth
Amendment."'
The Eleventh Circuit also examined the issue of probable cause in
United States v. Gordon. 9 Defendants were standing outside a
vehicle in a high crime area of the city. When the officers approached,
defendants left quickly in the vehicle. 2 ° After determining the officers
had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle involved, the court
examined whether probable cause existed for defendant's arrest for
loitering in violation of Florida's anti-loitering statute. 2 ' The court
stated the two elements of the statute as follows: "(1) the accused must
be loitering or prowling at a place, at a time, or in a manner not unusual
for law-abiding citizens; and (2) the loitering or prowling must be under
circumstances that warrant a reasonable fear for the safety of persons
or property in the vicinity."' 22 The court found that probable cause
existed under the first prong of the statute because defendant was
standing in a high crime area, near abandoned buildings and near a
parked car.'23 In addition, the court noted that the magazine cartridges easily satisfied the second prong, combined with the "notoriety
of the area for drive-by shootings, these facts justified a reasonable fear
for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.", 24 The court then
concluded that probable cause existed for the arrest, and the evidence
obtained from the car was properly admitted into evidence at trial. 2 '
D.

Consent Searches

In the foregoing discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's bus sweepdecision in Smith, it was noted that the court found the officers' conduct
to constitute a seizure, but nonetheless found the seizure reasonable

117. Id. The court noted specifically that "'officers may presume that a person is at
home at certain times of the day-a presumption which can be rebutted by contrary evidence
regarding the suspect's known schedule.'" Id. (quoting Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535).
118. Id.
119. 231 F.3d at 758.
120. Id. at 755.
121. Id. at 758.
122. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021(1) (West 2000)). The court also noted that
among the relevant factors to consider "in determining whether reasonable fear exists,
include[es] 'the fact that the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer.'" Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021(2)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 759.

2001]

CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL

1321

under the circumstances. 26
In United States v. Drayton,27 the
Eleventh Circuit rejected attempts by the government to distinguish
recent Eleventh Circuit decisions holding that bus sweeps constituted
seizures. 28 In Drayton the court held that the consent given by
defendants for a pat down search on the bus was "not sufficiently free
of coercion to serve as a valid basis for a search" under the Fourth
Amendment.'29 The court's analysis focused on a comparison with the
court's previous decision in United States v. Washington.3 ' In Washington two federal agents boarded a bus while the bus driver was in the
station. One of the agents made an announcement to the passengers,
while holding up his badge, that they were federal agents, that they
were "conducting a routine bus check," and that they would be asking to
see everyone's identification, ticket, and location of baggage.' 3' When
the agents in Washington reached defendant, his suspicious behavior
with his baggage prompted them to seek consent from defendant for a
pat down search. Defendant consented and drugs were found in
containers beneath his clothing.' 32 The court in Washington concluded
that a seizure had occurred, emphasizing that the officers had not
informed the passengers of their right not to cooperate.' 33 Because
defendant was not free to decline the request of the officers, he was
seized and his consent had no effect.'
The court in Drayton concluded that the facts were "not distinguishable in a meaningful way from those in Washington.""5 In Drayton
three local police officers boarded the bus while the driver was in the
station. The officers, as in Washington, were casually dressed but had
badges and were armed. While on the bus, the officers approached each
passenger one at a time showing law enforcement identification to each
passenger, asking them to identify their luggage, and requesting
permission to check the luggage. The officers became suspicious when
they approached defendants and noticed they were wearing inappropriate clothing given the weather. The officers requested permission to pat

126.
127.
128.

201 F.3d at 1322-23. See supra text accompanying notes 2-21.
231 F.3d 787 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 790-91.

129. Id. at 788.
130. 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998). See supra note 11.
131.
132.

Drayton, 231 F.3d at 790 (citing Washington, 151 F.3d at 1355).
Washington, 151 F.3d at 1356.

133. Id. at 1357.
134. Id.
135. 231 F.3d at 788.
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down defendants and they consented. Drugs were found on both
defendants taped underneath their clothing.13
The government made several arguments to distinguish the two cases.
First, the government argued that the officers in Drayton did not make
an announcement to the passengers as a whole prior to requesting
consent from each individually. 13 The court found that while the facts
differed in this respect, the show of authority on an individual basis in
Drayton was no "less coercive than [the] general bus-wide one" in
Washington.3 ' Further, while the officers in Drayton did not request
identification and tickets from the passengers as those in Washington
did, the court citing United States v. Guapi,'3 9 noted that this did not
reduce the coercive nature of the requests. 4 ' Another difference
between the two cases was that the officer in Drayton testified that on
previous bus searches, passengers had on occasion refused to consent to
the search of their baggage or exited the bus, but the court found this
unpersuasive for several reasons.'
First, the court noted parenthetically that in Guapi, this fact was unpersuasive.' 42 Further, given the
large number of bus stops testified to by the officer, the number of nonconsents was extremely small. 43 Finally, the court noted that the
final distinction "actually cut[] in the defendants' favor."44 When the
officers initially boarded the bus in the Drayton case, one officer
remained in the driver's seat to observe the passengers while the other
officers spoke with the passengers."' The court reasoned that the
presence of the officer at an exit on the bus "might make a reasonable
person feel less free to leave the bus." 4 '

136. Id. at 789-90.
137. Id. at 790.
138. Id.
139. 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998). The court acknowledged in a footnote that "In
Guapi, this Court stated that when officers individually approach passengers and
communicate an intention to conduct a search, instead of making a general announcement,
there is 'no reason to believe.., that they are coercing or intimidating citizens.'" 231 F.3d
at 790 n.5 (quoting Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1396). The court explained, however, that this was
dicta and not persuasive. Id.
140. 231 F.3d at 790. For more extensive treatment of Guapi, see Fleissner & Harris,
supra note 12, at 937.
141. 231 F.3d at 790-91.
142. Id. at 790 (citing Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1394).
143. Id. at 791.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing United States v. Hill, No. 99-12662 (11th Cir., July 24, 2000)

(unpublished opinion); Washington, 151 F.3d at 1358; Guapi. 144 F.3d at 1396)).
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The court held that because the decision in Washington was controlling precedent and the present facts were indistinguishable in any
material way, the search was "not sufficiently free of coercion to serve
as a valid basis for a search" under the Fourth Amendment. 4 ' The
convictions of the defendants were therefore reversed.'48 In scrutinizing the recent spate of bus sweep cases, the key fact seems to be whether
the officers told the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate.
Although the court renounced adopting a requirement that officers, in
essence, read bus passengers their rights, the recent decisions appear to
give officers little
choice but to do so, a point Judge Black made in his
149
Guapi dissent.

E. Exigent Circumstances and Anticipatory Warrants
Interestingly enough, the issue of anticipatory warrants was an issue
of first impression before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000.
The issue arose in United States v. Santa'50 in which the government
argued that exigent circumstances necessitated a warrantless entry and
search of a residence and that even if this was an illegal search, the
subsequent consent was voluntary and therefore validated the
search.' 5' The court concluded that exigent circumstances did not
justify the search
because the agents could have obtained an anticipato52
ry warrant.

Defendant, Santa, and her husband, Ramirez, had been under
surveillance by the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). A
confidential informant arranged to buy heroin from defendant and her
husband. The actual exchange was to take place at the residence of
defendant and her husband located in an apartment complex. The
informant was to go to the apartment, confirm that the drugs were
present, and then signal the agents to that effect. All went according to
plan and the informant signaled the agents when the drugs were
brought into the apartment. The agents had also observed the
individual who brought the drugs to the apartment complex. After the
agents got the signal, they entered the apartment through the front door
and through the rear sliding doors. The agents then did a protective
sweep of the apartment, read Mr. Ramirez his rights, and asked him

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 788.
Id. at 791.
151 F.3d at 1358 (Black, J., dissenting).
236 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 667.
Id. at 674.
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where the heroin was. Mr. Ramirez told the officers where the heroin
was located and afterward signed a consent to search the apartment.'5 3
The court examined several issues in this case. First, the court held
that exigent circumstances did not exist allowing a warrantless entry
into the apartment.5 4 The court began by stating the general rule
that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable" 55 but allowed "where both probable
cause and exigent circumstances exist." 5 ' The court held that the
agents had probable cause, but the real question was whether exigent
circumstances existed.'5 7 The court emphasized that the "exigency
exception only applies when 'the inevitable delay incident to obtaining
a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.'"'58
Further, the court stated that this was often the case with narcotics. 5 9
But, the court also pointed out that the presence of contraband does not
automatically mean exigent circumstances exist. 6 ° The test for
exigent circumstances is an objective test based upon the facts in the
particular case. 16'
The court then turned to the facts in the present case and held that
exigent circumstances did not exist in the seizure of either the heroin or
Mr. Ramirez."' The government argued that exigent circumstances
existed because the agents had to prevent the destruction of the drugs,
the apartment was difficult to monitor, and the suspects "would have
become suspicious if the [informant had] not return[ed] promptly with
the money" while awaiting a warrant.'
The court examined each
argument and rejected them respectively: First, the court noted that the
suspects were unaware they were under surveillance and "'[c]ircumstances are not normally considered exigent where the suspects are unaware
of police surveillance."" 6 4 The court also rejected the difficulty the
agents had with surveillance of the apartment as necessitating
warrantless entry.6' Specifically, the court said that "'[wie will not

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 664-67.
Id. at 670-71.
Id. at 668 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 586).
Id. (citing United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Id. at 669.
Id. (quoting United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Id. (quoting Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510).
Id. (quoting United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Id. (citing Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510).
Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 669-70 (citing Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1511).
Id. at 670.

2001]

CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL

1325

hold that the warrantless search of an individual's home may be justified
by the police's inability to maintain effective surveillance, particularly
when no exigency has been established.'""' Finally, the court found
that regardless of whether or not the suspects expected the informant to
return, "'a warrantless search is [still] illegal when police possess
probable cause but instead of obtaining a warrant create exigent
circumstances.'"16 7 The court reasoned that because a search warrant
could have been obtained based upon information known before the
68
transaction was to occur, exigent circumstances did not exist.

The court then examined the constitutionality of anticipatory search
warrants, an issue of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit. 169 The
court began by describing anticipatory search warrants as those that are
supported by "'probable cause to believe that [the contraband] will be [at
the location specified] when the search warrant is executed.'"' 7 ° The
court explained that the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be
reasonable and supported by probable cause.' 7' The court then
reasoned that there was "nothing unreasonable about authorizing a
search for tomorrow, not today, when reliable information indicates that
[the contraband will reach a particular location], not now, but then."'7 2
Further, the court stated that it is reasonable to "tie the warrant's
search authority to the future event that brings with it the probable
cause."173 Therefore, the court held that anticipatory search
warrants
174
were constitutional if issued in the proper circumstances.
The court then examined the present case and determined that under
the circumstances, the agents had "sufficient information to obtain an
anticipatory search warrant," or a warrant by telephone before they

166. Id. (quoting Lynch, 934 F.2d at 1233 n.4). The court noted that it was unlikely
that defendants would flee with their small children in the apartment. Id.
167. Id. at 671 (quoting Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1511).

168. Id.
169. Id. at 672. The court noted that every other circuit that has examined this issue
has held that anticipatory search warrants are not "categorically unconstitutional." Id.
(citing United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Garcia,
882 F.2d 699, 702-04 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th Cir.
1990); United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Leidner,

99 F.3d 1423, 1425-26 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811, 814-15 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1986)).
170. Id. (quoting Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702).
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994)).
173. Id. at 672-73 (citing Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 11).
174. Id. at 673.
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forced entry into the apartment.175 In conclusion, the court held that
"in circumstances such as those presented here, where law enforcement
agents have ample time and information to secure an anticipatory search
warrant, lack of time to obtain a warrant after delivery of the contraband is insufficient to justify a warrantless search."'76 The ruling has
significant implications for the conduct of run-of-the-mill undercover
operations, such as the "buy-bust" scenario in Santa.
This holding did not end the inquiry, however. The government
argued that even if the search was illegal, the subsequent consent given
by Mr. Ramirez to search the apartment validated the search.'77 The
court began by articulating the general rule that "[flor consent given
after an illegal seizure to be valid, the Government must prove two
things: that the consent is voluntary, and that the consent was not a
product of the illegal seizure." 7 8 The court did not decide whether or
not the consent was voluntary because the court disposed of this issue
by holding that the "consent did not purge the primary taint of the
illegal entry and arrest.", 79 The court stated that three factors are
considered when determining whether a "voluntary consent was obtained
by exploitation of an illegal seizure."8 ° These include: "the temporal
proximity of the seizure and the consent, the presence of intervening
circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct."'
The court explained that the magistrate judge had
misstated the law and that the proper inquiry was not whether the will
of the defendant was overborne but whether the consent was a "product"
of the illegal entry.'82 The presence of intervening circumstances or83
a lapse in time can function to eliminate the taint to the consent.
However, the court reasoned that because there was no lapse in time nor

175. Id. The court articulated the test for anticipatory warrants as the following: The
information to support the warrants "'must show, not only that the agent believes a
delivery of contraband is going to occur, but also how he has obtained this belief, how
reliable his sources are, and what part government agents will play in the delivery.'" Id.
(quoting Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (authorizing telephone
warrants).
176. 236 F.3d at 674.
177. Id. at 676.
178. Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir. 1980)).
179. Id. at 677.
180. Id. The court noted by citation the use of these factors in other situations. Id.
(comparing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); Dunnaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 218 (1979); United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991)).
181. Id.
182. Id. This squarely places the burden at this point on the government to show the
consent was not a product of the illegal entry. Id.
183. Id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1013 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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intervening circumstances, the consent was gained through taint of the
illegal entry and was therefore invalid."' Further, the court held that
the subsequent signed consent was "'the result and the fruit of the
first'" and did not validate the search. 18 5
The most significant aspect of the court's decision in Santa was the
court's conclusion that the possibility that an anticipatory warrant could
have been obtained, perhaps by way of a telephonic warrant as allowed
under Rule 41, demonstrated that exigent circumstances did not
exist.18
This holding could have significant implications for law
enforcement agents monitoring evolving drug transactions. If Santa is
strictly applied, agents will need a warrant when they have probable
cause to predict the location of the drugs. The exigencies of the breaking
transaction would no longer allow a warrantless search. Obviously,
defense counsel should consider the use of Santa in cases in which the
government is relying on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless
search. Santa may represent a reinvigoration of the warrant clause and
a withering of the exigent circumstances exception.
F

Warrants: Sufficiency and Good Faith

Another warrant issue examined by the Eleventh Circuit was the
sufficiency of evidence necessary to constitute probable cause. In United
States v. Jiminez,87 the court held that an affidavit based upon
information obtained from a wiretap, although not detailed, was
sufficient to constitute probable cause and, therefore, supported the
issuance of a search warrant.'8 8 Defendant Jiminez and his girlfriend
were under investigation as a result of information obtained from a
separate methamphetamine investigation. The officers placed a valid
wiretap on the residential line of defendant and his girlfriend from May
11 to May 31, 1995. Defendant Jimenez was later arrested after he was
found in his vehicle with six bricks of marijuana, along with a weapon.
The investigating officers then sought a search warrant based primarily
upon the information obtained from the wiretaps, which intercepted
about 1200 conversations. Upon executing the warrant, more drugs,
money, drug ledgers, and weapons were discovered at the residence.

184. Id. at 678. Here, the search occurred about three minutes after the agents entered
the apartment. Id. at 677. The court also held that the Miranda warnings alone could not
eliminate the taint of the illegal entry. Id. at 678 (citing Robinson, 625 F.2d at 1220).
185. Id. at 678 (quoting Rrnwn, 422 U.S. at 605).
186. Id. at 673.
187. 224 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2000).
188. Id. at 1249.
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Defendant filed a motion to suppress and the district court denied the
9
8
motion. Defendant appealed.
Defendant first argued that the affidavit supporting the warrant was

deficient because it did not show that defendant and his girlfriend were
actually the individuals living at the residence described in the

affidavit.'9

The court found that one statement in the affidavit

established the necessary connection between defendant and the
residence to be searched: "The information indicates that Jimenez has
secreted large sums of currency in the residence and the currency is
derived from the distribution of methamphetamine and cannabis."' 9'
The court then concluded that this statement "demonstrate[d] the link
between Jimenez's illegal activity and the house." 192
Next defendant argued that the affidavit only alleged conclusions
obtained from the wiretap and not the necessary underlying facts;
therefore, the affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause."3

189. Id. at 1245-46.
190. Id. at 1247. Defendant argued specifically that "there is a complete absence of any
facts to support a finding that the residence where [defendant and his girlfriend] live and
supposedly conduct their drug business is in fact the house described in the Application."
Id. (citing Appellant's Brief at 25).
191. Id. (quoting Aft. Supp. Search Warrant).
192. Id.
193. Id. The specific statements found in the affidavit were as follows:
During the past eighteen days your Affiant received information from a Title III
Wire intercept. The information obtained indicates that Evelyn Sims and Alberto
Jimenez are involved in the transportation, distribution, and sales of Methamphetamine and Cannabis on a large scale. The information indicates that Sims and
Jimenez conduct the methamphetamine and cannabis transactions at their
residence and also deliver the methamphetamine and cannabis to their customers
on a continual basis. The information indicates that Sims and Jimenez keep
records, logs, and ledgers detailing the transactions along with debts owed them
for methamphetamine and cannabis by their customers at their residence. The
information indicates that Jimenez has secreted large sums of currency in the
residence and that the currency is derived from the distribution of methamphetamine and cannabis. The information provided indicates that Sims and Jimenez
have taken stolen property, specifically firearms as payment for methamphetamine and cannabis. On 05-27-94 Your Affiant received information from the
reliable source that Jimenez was en route to the Frostproof area to pick-up
narcotics and return to Highlands County with them. The information resulted
in a Carrol search of Jimenez's vehicle when he returned to Highlands county and
the seizure of six pounds of Cannabis and the arrest of Jimenez, who has since
bonded out of jail. During the Carrol Search of the vehicle a loaded 9mm semiautomatic pistol was located with the narcotics. Your Affiant noted that the six
pounds of Cannabis were cut into one pound blocks and was comprised of tightly
compressed "bricks" which appeared to have been part of a larger shipment.
Id. at 1248 (quoting Aft. Supp. Search Warrant).
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The court first articulated the standard to be used by the district court
judge in analyzing the sufficiency of a warrant as "'a practical, common
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and the 'basis of knowledge'
of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.'"'9 4 The court then examined the factual basis of the warrant
as derived from the wiretap.1 95 The court noted that the affidavit was
not really conclusory because it did not actually state that probable
cause existed."9 The court then reasoned that, while perhaps the
affidavit should have contained some of the conversations from the
wiretap, it simply summarized the information known, and adequately
stated the source of that information for purposes of veracity. 19 7 The
court then held that the "affidavit was neither conclusory nor unsubstantiated and provided an adequate, though perhaps not extensive, basis for
the ...

court's determination that probable cause existed."'98

Finally, defendant argued that the arrest described in the affidavit
was stale and therefore could not establish probable cause.'
The
court, however, noted that stale information in an affidavit in support
of probable cause for a search "is not fatal where the government's
affidavit updates, substantiates, or corroborates the stale material."2"
Here, the court found that the wiretap information provided in the
affidavit "updated and corroborated Jimenez's involvement with
drugs."2 ° ' The court concluded that based on the information provided
in the affidavit, "there was a fair probability that Jimenenz was involved
with illegal activity and that evidence of that activity would be found at
the house described in the warrant."0 2 This result seems sound.
The Eleventh Circuit also had occasion to examine the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. The good faith exception first

194. 224 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
195. Id.
196. Id. The court noted that this distinguishes the present case from the Aguilar case.

Id.
197. Id. at 1248-49.
198. Id. at 1249.
199. Id. The arrest was provided in the affidavit as occurring in 1994 in error. The

court noted that this was the information to be examined because it was what actually
appeared in the affidavit. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Magluta, 198 F.3d at 1272).
201. Id.
202. Id. The court declined to address whether the good faith exception applied as
argued by the government in this case because the warrant was valid. Id. at 1249 n.1.

1330

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

announced in United States v. Leon... was intended to fit those
situations in which there would be no deterrent effect upon law
enforcement because of "an objectively reasonable belief that their
conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment."" 4 In United States
v. Travers, °5 the Eleventh Circuit examined the issue of whether the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to an overly broad
and therefore unconstitutional warrant.0 6
In Travers the Eleventh Circuit held that an overly broad search
warrant articulating the items to be seized as "all documents involving
real estate, litigation, property, mailings, photographs and any other
material reflecting identity, and anything reflecting potential fraud," was
reasonably relied upon by the executing officers as valid and therefore
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.0 v Defendant
was convicted of "mail fraud, equity skimming, money laundering and
bankruptcy fraud."0 8 All of these convictions were based upon
defendant's activities in assuming Veterans Administration mortgages
and Federal Housing Association mortgages; renting the homes; filing for
bankruptcy to forestall foreclosure of the homes; and not paying the
previously obtained mortgages. Upon obtaining the above described
search warrant, the agents seized boxes of documents consisting of
everything from deeds to birth certificates illustrating defendants use of
aliases. Defendant challenged the use of this evidence at trial, and the
district court concluded that while the warrant was unconstitutional
because it was overly broad, the good faith exception nevertheless
applied.20 9
The court focused its inquiry on the reasonableness of relying upon the
warrant on its face.210 The court held that the warrant was not so

203.
204.

468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Id. at 918.

205. 233 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2000).
206. Id. at 1329-30.
207. Id. at 1330-31.
208. Id. at 1328.
209. Id. at 1328-29.
210. Id. at 1330. The court described the scope of the warrant as follows:
[P]ermitt[ing] the officers to search for all documents involving real estate,
litigation, property, mailings, photographs and any other material reflecting
identity, and anything reflecting potential fraud. Pursuant to the warrant, the
executing officers seized copies of warranty deeds and other documents reflecting
Travers' use of false identities to purchase properties; notary public seals for
signatures that Travers forged on various deeds and other legal documents;
passports, birth certificates, drivers licenses, and credit cards issued in various
names; business cards for businesses in various names; letters to tenants written
by Travers using both his names and aliases; copies of bankruptcy pleadings,

20011

CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL

1331

overly broad on its face that it was unreasonable for the officers to rely
on it.2" The court first noted that based upon precedent, the good
faith exception can be applied to overly broad warrants as long as the
warrant is not so overly broad on its face "that the executing officers
could not have reasonably presumed it to be valid."212 The court then
looked at the complexity of the case, which involved a "complex scheme
to commit financial fraud," and reasoned that a wide variety of
documentary evidence would be relevant in this type of case.21 The
court recognized that the nature of these cases requires a more "'flexible
214
reading of the [F]ourth [A]mendment particularity requirement.'
Given this reasoning, the court noted, as did the district court, that
whether the warrant was overly broad was a close call.2" 5 Therefore,
the court held it was not unreasonable for the executing officers to rely
upon the warrant as valid on its face.2" 6
This decision nicely illustrates the significant limitation on the
exclusionary rule represented by Leon. If a reasonable officer could have
relied on the warrant believing it to be based on probable cause,
suppression is not appropriate because suppression would not have a
deterrent effect on the police. The theory is that you cannot deter an
officer acting in good faith. The bottom line as a result of Leon is that
evidence will rarely be suppressed when a judge issues a warrant.
G. Administrative Searches and Reasonable Suspicion
The Supreme Court has held that the traditional standards of the
Fourth Amendment, such as probable cause and the warrant requirement, are not required for searches and seizures that promote certain
government interests (apart from criminal law enforcement). The
recognized classes of so-called administrative or "special needs" searches
and seizures include such government activities as housing and business
inspections, drug testing of certain government employees, school
searches, stops at vehicle checkpoints, and searches at the border and in
jails. The Supreme Court has adopted a balancing approach to weigh
the government interest against the intrusiveness of the search or
letters to bankruptcy courts, and other filings reflecting Travers' attempts to delay
foreclosures; and various other documents concerning Travers' use of aliases, mail
drop boxes, and false addresses to avoid detection.

Id.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Accardo, 749 F.2d at 1481).
Id.
Id. at 1331.
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seizure and determine the quantum of suspicion, if any, and the
procedure required for the government action (e.g., whether a warrant
is required).
In Skurstenis v. Jones,217 the Eleventh Circuit examined whether
two strip searches, one for weapons and one for lice, conducted as a
result of plaintiff's arrest for driving under the influence, violated the
Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search.21 When plaintiff was
arrested, the officer found a handgun in the floorboard of her car.
Plaintiff had an expired permit to carry the gun. Plaintiff was then
taken to the jail to remain there until 11:00 a.m. the next morning. At
the jail, plaintiff was taken into a room and strip searched by a female
officer. The next morning at 10:30 a.m., plaintiff was again strip
searched but this time in the infirmary by a male nurse's assistant who
worked part-time at the jail. The district court ruled the searches were
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment but that the officer was
entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded however
that the sheriff and nurse's assistant were not.2 19
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by articulating the holding of the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish 220 that "routine
strip searching of pretrial detainees [is] not a per se violation of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures."22' Instead, the Supreme Court had applied a balancing
test.222 A court when examining the reasonableness of these types of
searches should balance the "'need for the particular search against the
invasion of personal rights that the search entails.' ' 22' The court
noted several factors to consider when making this determination
including, "'the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which
it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which'
[it occurred]." 224 Finally, the court stated that the reasonable suspicion standard should be applied to determining whether a search is
permissible.225
The court then turned to the facts of the present case and first found
that because the jail's policy required that every inmate be searched
prior to placement in a cell, regardless of reasonable suspicion, the policy

217.

236 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2000).

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 680-81.
Id.
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
236 F.3d at 681 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559).
Id.
Id. at 682 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 559).
Id.

225.

Id.
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was unconstitutional.226 However, the court found reasonable suspicion in the present case for the initial search because police found a
weapon in plaintiff's vehicle when she was apprehended. 227 This fact
alone is sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion especially in light
of the security dangers inherent in a detention facility.228

The court

then examined the manner and place of the search. 229 The court
reasoned that because plaintiff was searched alone in a room with only
officer observing, it was conducted with the least intrusive
a female
means. 230 Therefore, the court held that the initial strip search was
233

constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.23 1
The court then examined the strip search by the male nurse's
assistant.2 32 The court began its analysis by noting that under
Alabama law, the sheriff has legal custody of all inmates in the jail and
further has a statutory duty to "'exercise every precaution to prevent the
spread of disease among the inmates.' 23" The court then described the
jail's procedures designed to limit the spread of disease: First, a search
for signs of disease is generally to be conducted at the earliest possible
time during an individual's detention. This search for disease includes
a search for lice, which is difficult to contain and destroy in an inmate
population if not detected early. The jail contracted with a medical
center to provide the personnel to conduct these examinations. 23 4 The
court then explained that the procedures used to determine how the
searches are to be done are those promulgated by the medical center.235 The procedure for the search for lice called for examination of
both cranial and pubic hair with no "unnecessary contact with the
inmate," including touching the genitals.236
The court then applied the factors necessary to determine reasonableness under Bell. 237 The court reasoned that because the search was

226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. The court noted that this is a legitimate concern recognized in other cases.
Id. (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 11 (1980)).
229. Id.
230. Id. The court also noted that a body cavity search was not conducted. Further,
the court relied upon a similar case holding that under these circumstances, the search is
conducted in the "least intrusive manner." Id. (citing Justice v. City of Peachtree, 961 F.2d
188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 682-83 (quoting ALA. CODE § 14-6-95 (1995)).
234. Id. at 683.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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conducted in the infirmary and no other individuals were present, the
intrusion was minimal.2" The court also concluded that because of the
risk inherent in the spread of lice in detention facilities, the search was
justified.2 39 Finally, the court found the manner reasonable because
medical personnel conducted the search.24 ° The court reasoned that
while courts have not ruled on this specific issue, they have considered
body cavity searches by medical personnel. 24' The court noted that
most courts require that medical personnel perform the searches instead
of jail personnel. 242 The court further noted that most courts did not
even mention the sex of the medical person performing the search,
emphasizing the minimal importance of this issue when the individual
is a trained medical provider.24 3 The court then held that "it is not
inappropriate for medical personnel to conduct a strip search of an
inmate of the opposite sex," and the search of plaintiff was reasonable
and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.244
Significantly, the court never focused on the fact that the plaintiff was
searched for lice just minutes prior to her release.245 It would seem
that this would be a relevant factor in determining whether the search
was justified. The plaintiff and the district court did focus on this aspect
of the search but the Eleventh Circuit noted in a footnote that "[the fact
that the search preceded Skurstenis's release from custody by just a few
minutes was merely coincidental."246
III.

THE FiFTH AMENDMENT

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand

Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

238. Id.
239. Id. at 684.
240. Id. The district court found the manner of the search particularly "offensive"
because it involved the search of a female by a male. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 683-84 (citing Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d
1523 (7th Cir. 1988); Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1986); Unwin v. Campbell, 863
F.2d 124, 136 (1st Cir. 1988); Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 295 (10th Cir. 1973);
Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1988); Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609,
610, 612 (2d Cir. 1978)).
243. Id. at 683.
244. Id. at 684.
245. Id. at 683.
246. Id. at 683 n.6.
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jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.247
A.

PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination

Last term in Dickerson v. United States,2 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the holding of Miranda v.Arizona.249 As a result, courts
must continue to interpret the Miranda standards. During the survey
period, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided two noteworthy
cases dealing with the Miranda procedures. The first case, United States
251
v. Muegge,25 ° dealt with the issue of what constitutes custody,
which is important because an individual's
Miranda rights are not
252
triggered until the individual is in custody.
In Muegge the court reversed the district court's order granting
defendant's motion to suppress his statements because the court of
appeals concluded that defendant was not in custody during the
interrogation.253 Defendant worked as a civilian employee at Robins
Air Force Base in Warner Robins, Georgia, when the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations ("OSI")investigated reported use of government
computers for looking at child pornography. Defendant was directed by
his supervisor to go to the OSI detachment building for questioning. The
OSI building is locked at all times and all visitors are escorted during
their visit. The interview lasted about two and a half hours, during
which time defendant was twice accompanied outside the building by an
OSI agent to have a cigarette. The OSI interviewers informed defendant
that he was free to leave and did not have to answer any questions.
Ultimately, defendant admitted to viewing pornography, including child
pornography, on government computers and at home, consented to a
search of his home, and signed a written statement. Also, at the end of
the interview, defendant initialed an interview form, which contained a
statement of his Miranda rights, but he had not been advised of those
rights prior to or during the interview. It was not until more than eight
months after the interview that defendant was arrested and charged

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
Id. at 2329; 384 U.S. 436, 490-91 (1966).
225 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1271.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
225 F.3d at 1271.
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with two counts of possession of child pornography. The district court
found the interrogation to be custodial.254
The court of appeals began by recognizing that under Miranda, prior
to any interrogation, an individual taken into custody must be advised
of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.255 Formal arrest
is not required for an interrogation to be custodial.2"' Rather, the
standard is whether "under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would feel a restraint on his
freedom of movement fairly characterized as that degree associated with
a formal arrest to such extent that he would not feel free to leave."257
A reasonable person is a reasonable innocent person.2 5 In applying
this test, the court of appeals concluded that the district court placed too
much weight on the fact that defendant was ordered to go to the OSI
building because "such an order, absent other coercive elements, did not
constitute the type of restraint on [defendant's] freedom associated with
a formal arrest."259 The court of appeals held that "if the individual
being questioned were innocent, and was told directly he might leave, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary the interrogation was noncustodial as a matter of law."280 Here, the mere fact that the interrogation took place at a secure facility was not enough to make the
interrogation custodial because defendant was never arrested or
physically restrained. 261 Being ordered to the OSI building did not
make it custodial given that defendant came and left of his own
accord.262 Being escorted during the two cigarette breaks defendant
received did not make the interrogation custodial because all visitors are
escorted while in the OSI building.2 3 While the building was locked,
no key was needed to leave. 26 4 Finally, defendant left when the
interview was over and was not arrested until almost eight months
later.265 All of these facts led the court of appeals to conclude that
254. Id. at 1268-69.
255. Id. at 1269-70 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79).
256. Id. at 1270.
257. Id. (quoting United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1271. The court of appeals indicated that while the district court assumed
without making any finding of fact that defendant was informed that he could leave, a
contrary finding of fact would have been clearly erroneous. Id. at 1270.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 1271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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defendant was not in custody.2 This conclusion is consistent with the
Eleventh Circuit's prior holding that an interrogation that occurs in a
police station can be noncustodial.267 Cases involving a suspect in a
police station or similar facility deserve close scrutiny, particularly if it
appears that the questioners capitalized on the environment to pry a
confession out of the suspect. But it is certainly not the case that
suspects must be deemed in custody because the location of an interview
is a police station.
In the second case, Mincey v. Head,2" the court addressed allegations that the police officers violated Edwards v. Arizona.269 In
Edwards the Supreme Court held that when an individual is in custody,
once the individual requests an attorney, all interrogation must
stop.270

But what constitutes a request for counsel?

In Mincey

defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus vacating his convictions on
several grounds, including that the police continued questioning him and
gained incriminating statements after he requested an attorney.
Defendant was arrested by officers Bob Boren and Clifton Spires, and as
they were taking defendant to the Bibb County Law Enforcement Center
27
("LEC"), Boren read defendant his Miranda rights. '

Defendant

claimed that he also said, "[Go ahead and run the lawyers," but Boren
and Spires denied this. 2 At LEC, Spires again read defendant his
rights, which defendant said he understood. Spires asked defendant to
sign a waiver of rights form, but even after the lines "fully understand
my right to an attorney," and "to make a statement to the officers" were
273
Defendant claimed that he
crossed out, defendant refused to sign it.

told Spires that he "needed a lawyer before (he] did anything," but
Spires denied being told this.274 Following defendant's refusal to sign
the waiver, defendant confessed. Defendant was then interviewed by
Boren and Deputy Sheriff Micheal Smallwood, who again read defendant
his rights.27 1 In response to a request for a signed statement, defendant said, "I'm not going to sign anything ....

266.
267.
268.
2000).
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

I need forty-five lawyers

Id.
See Phillips,812 F.2d at 1362.
206 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 2000), en banc reh'g denied, 229 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir.
451 U.S. 477 (1981); 206 F.3d at 1131-32.
451 U.S. at 484-85.
206 F.3d at 1117.
Id. at 1127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1128 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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to get out of this stuff."276 At this point, the officers stopped questioning defendant.27 7
An evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court found that the
statements were freely and voluntarily given, and thus admissible. The
trial court did not believe defendant told Spires that he needed an
attorney after refusing to sign the waiver. 27' However, "[tihe court
acknowledged that [defendant] indicated in the patrol car and again at
the LEC that he wanted a lawyer, but found that he never asked for a
lawyer."2 79 In addition, the statement about needing forty-five lawyers
"was not such a request but merely an offhand remark."28 ° On direct
appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. On habeas corpus, the
district court adopted the state trial court's findings of fact and reached
the same conclusion.2 81
The court of appeals began by acknowledging that it was bound by the
state trial court's findings of fact, but that it reviewed a district court's
determination of the questions of law and mixed questions of law and
fact de novo.282 Although defendant argued that he did not waive his
right to silence or his right to an attorney, the court concluded that
defendant was really contending that after he invoked his right to
counsel the officers improperly continued to question him. 28" The court
began with the rule from Miranda that once an individual who is in
custody asserts his right to counsel, all questioning must stop.284 To
resolve defendant's claim, the court had to decide whether, under Davis
v. United States,285 defendant's statement constituted a request for an
attorney.286 Under Davis "[a]lthough a suspect need not 'speak with
the discrimination of an Oxford don,' he must articulate his desire to
have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer
in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for
an attorney."28 7 Thus, "if the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to

276. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1129.
279. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
280. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1131.
283. Id.
284. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).
285. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
286. 206 F.3d at 1131-32.
287. 512 U.S. at 459 (internal citation omitted).
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stop questioning him."2 88 Based on this, the Court in Davis held that
the suspect's statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was not an
unambiguous request for an attorney. 2 9 Therefore, in Mincey the
court of appeals concluded that defendant's claim that he was questioned
after asking for an attorney turned upon whether "'go ahead and run the
lawyers' constituted an 'unambiguous or unequivocal request for
counsel.'" 2" The court reached that conclusion because the questioning stopped after defendant's statement about needing forty-five
attorneys and because the trial court did not believe defendant told
Spires that he needed an attorney. 29 The court held that "go ahead
and run the lawyers," obviously did not constitute an "unambiguous or
unequivocal request for counsel." 292 The court also was unpersuaded
by defendant's argument that his refusal to sign the waiver was "an
immediate demand for counsel."293
While it is hardly surprising that the court would find that defendant's
statement was ambiguous, defendant's statement could be distinguished
from the statement in Davis. Here, defendant worded his statement as
a command and made it in the context of discussing Miranda, whereas
in Davis the statement held to be ambiguous was like a question. When,
in the context of discussing Miranda, an obviously inarticulate suspect
says "go ahead and run the lawyers," it would be reasonable for the
officers to interpret such a command as a request for an attorney. At
the very least, a reasonable officer might want to clarify the statement.
After all, it would be untenable for the court to hold that a command
such as "go ahead and call the lawyers" was not an unambiguous
request for an attorney. However, because this defendant used the
unusual verb "run," his command regarding an attorney is deemed
ambiguous. Thus, while suspects are not required to be Oxford dons, it
appears they must be at least as articulate as high school graduates to
be fully protected by Miranda.
Another interesting aspect of this case was the findings made by the
state trial court. The trial court found that defendant made the
statement "go ahead and run the lawyers," despite the fact that the
officers denied that defendant said it.294 By finding that defendant

288. Id. at 461-62.
289. Id. at 462.
290. 206 F.3d at 1132 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 462) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
291. See id. at 1132 n.61.
292. Id. at 1132 (internal quotation marks omitted).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1128-29.
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made the statement, the trial court implicitly found that the officers'
statements were false. Moreover, the trial court found that defendant
"indicated ... that he wanted a lawyer, but found that he never asked
for a lawyer."295 Thus, the apparently false (or at least discounted)
statements by the officers, a finding that defendant indicated he wanted
an attorney, or a combination of the two was not enough to exclude
defendant's statements.
B.

Grand Jury
The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to be indicted by a grand
jury."' Thus the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted as limiting
amendments to an indictment.297 Constructive amendments, which
occur when the jury instruction provides a greater basis to convict than
does 29the
indictment, violate a defendant's right to be indicted by a grand
8
jury.

In United States v. Simpson,299 defendant claimed that the trial
court constructively amended his indictment when it instructed the jury.
Counts IV and VI of the indictment charged that defendant "did
knowingly use and carry a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
crime." 300 The trial court instructed the jury that defendant could be
convicted if the jury found that defendant "used or carried a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking offense."3"' Defendant claimed that by
him due process by
changing "and" to "or," the district court denied
30 2
lessening the government's burden of proof.
In determining if jury instructions misstate the law or prejudice the
defendant by misleading the jury, the court reviews them de novo.303
The court of appeals looked to its earlier case, United States v.
Poarch, °4 for the standard for when a jury instruction constructively
amends an indictment: "'[a] constructive amendment to the indictment
occurs where the jury instructions so modify the elements of the offense
charged that the defendant may have been convicted on a ground not
alleged by the indictment."'3 0 5 Such an error is reversible error per

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 1129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 632-33 (11th Cir. 1990).
See United States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 1999).
228 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1299 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added by court).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added by court).
Id.
Id. at 1298.
878 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1989).

305. 228 F.3d at 1299 (quoting Poarch, 878 F.2d at 1358) (alteration in original).
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se."° While defendant's indictment charged him with "use and carry,"
the statute only requires proof of defendant's "use or carry."3"7
Therefore, the court found that because defendant was charged with
more than was required, there was no risk that he would be convicted
on a ground not alleged in the indictment. S"' Moreover, the court
stated that it is well established law that when "an indictment charges
in the conjunctive several means of violating a statute, a conviction may
be obtained on proof of only one of the means, and accordingly the jury
instruction may properly be framed in the disjunctive." °9 The court
thus applied the proper standard. Statutes list ways of violating the law
in the disjunctive. Indictments, which are to inform the defendant of all
the theories he must meet at trial, list the ways of violating the law in
the conjunctive. Jury instructions revert to the disjunctive because the
statue allows conviction based on only one of the ways of violating the
statute.
C. Double Jeopardy
The court of appeals addressed the doctrine of multiplicity, a creature
of the Double Jeopardy Clause, in United States v. Smith. 310 Multiplicity occurs when a single crime is charged in more than one count.31
For Double Jeopardy purposes, two counts charge a single crime unless
both counts require proof of an element or of a fact that the other does
not.3" 2 The Double Jeopardy infirmity of multiplicitous indictments is
that they subject a defendant to the possibility of multiple punishments
for what is the same crime under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 13
In Smith Count One charged defendants, Smith and Tyree, with
conspiring to vote more than once by fraudulently casting absentee
ballots. Count Two charged them with voting more than once. Counts
Three through Thirteen charged that in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c)1 14 either one or both of them gave false information on either an

application for absentee ballot or an affidavit of an absentee voter
concerning Angela Hill, Eddie Gilmore, Willie Carter, Cassandra Carter,

306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300.

310. 231 F.3d 800, 815 (11th Cir. 2000).
311.

James P. Fleissner, ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure,48 MERCER L. REV. 1485,

1610 (1997) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(c)
(2d ed. 1992)).
312. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

313. Id.
314. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1994).
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Shelton Braggs, and Sam Powell. The district court denied Smith and
Tyree's motion to dismiss the indictment because of selective prosecution
based on race and political affiliation.1 5
Issues of multiplicitous indictments are reviewed de novo.3" 6
"'Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in more than one
count. '' 3 7 Two evils may arise with multiplicitous counts: (1) "'the
defendant may receive multiple sentences for the same offense,"' and (2)
the jury may be improperly prejudiced by the suggestion that the
defendant committed several crimes instead of just one.31 8 The first
step in reviewing for multiplicity is determining the "'allowable unit of
prosecution.'"3 19 Defendants claimed that the allowable unit of
prosecution for Section 1973i(c) is all the steps in preparation of casting
a ballot regardless of the number of false documents.3 2 Therefore,
because one count charged giving false information on the application for
a particular voter's absentee ballot and charged giving false information
on the affidavit of the same voter in another count, defendants
contended the counts were multiplicitous. 32' However, the court of
appeals found that absentee ballot applications and absentee voter
affidavits are different documents with different purposes; therefore, "[a]
count charging the giving of false information on an application of
absentee ballot requires different proof than a count charging the giving
they
of false information on an affidavit of absentee voter."322 Because
3 23

are different offenses, the indictment was not multiplicitous.

D. Due Process
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
have been interpreted to guarantee a plethora of procedural safeguards
for criminal trials. 4 The Eleventh Circuit addressed several due
process issues during the survey period.
1. Equal Protection. Although based on its text, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the

315. 231 F.3d at 806. For discussion of defendants' claim of selective prosecution, see
infra text accompanying notes 335-55.
316. 231 F.3d at 807.
317. Id. at 815 (quoting United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798,802 (11th Cir. 1991)).
318. Id. (quoting Langford, 946 F.2d at 802).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See Fleissner & Harris, supra note 12, at 949.
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states, the Supreme Court. has applied the equal protection guarantees
to the federal government by finding it to be a component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.32 During the survey period,
the court of appeals decided two cases involving equal protection
challenges.
3 26
In the first case, United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera,
defendants
alleged that the prosecution's peremptory strike of a juror violated
Batson v. Kentucky."'
In Batson the Supreme Court held that a
defendant may object to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges
on the ground that the challenges are being used to strike jurors because
of their race, an impermissible basis.32 Subsequent cases recognized
the right of the prosecution to object to the defendant's peremptory
challenges and recognized that gender and ethnicity also are impermissible bases for peremptory challenges. 29 Under Batson once the party
challenging the strikes makes out a prima facie case of impermissible
purpose, which is usually based on a pattern of strikes, the party
making the strikes must prove a race-neutral or gender-neutral basis for
the strikes. 3
Regarding defendant's Batson challenge in Cordoba-Mosquera, the
court of appeals held that the trial court did not commit clear error in
finding that the prosecution presented a race-neutral reason to rebut
defendants' prima facie case. 3 1 When asked by the district court for
the reason for the peremptory strike, the prosecutor stated, "I didn't like
the way he was acting in court, his mannerisms. And I didn't think he
wanted to be a juror, so I struck him."3 2 The court of appeals stated
that "a prospective juror's inattentiveness is a proper race-neutral reason
for using a peremptory strike," and that the trial court's determination
that race did not motivate the peremptory strike should receive great
deference.333 The court also stressed that when the race-neutral

325. See Fleissner, supra note 311, at 1515-16 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975)).
326. 212 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2000).
327. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
328. Id. at 93-95.
329. See Georgia v. McCollom, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992) (prosecution may challenge
defendant's strikes). See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (gender);
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (Hispanics).
330. 476 U.S. at 97.
331. 212 F.3d at 1197.
332. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
333. Id. at 1198.
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reason focuses on inattentiveness signaled by 334body language and
mannerisms, deference is particularly warranted.
In the second case, United States v. Smith, the court addressed
defendants Smith and Tyree's claim that they were selectively prosecut335
ed based on race (they are black) and based on political affiliation.
For the selective prosecution claim, the district court's findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo.3 6 The court of appeals began by examining the standards set
out in United States v. Armstrong,337 which govern a selective prosecution claim. '8 The Supreme Court in Armstrong recognized that
prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding who to prosecute and there
is a strong "presumption of regularity" supporting such decisions. 39
However, the prosecutor is bound by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.o40 To prevail on a selective prosecution claim, a
defendant must present "clear evidence" that the prosecutor violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 4 ' A selective prosecution claim has two
prongs:
discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose.342
To
establish discriminatory effect, the claimant must prove similarly
situated individuals were not prosecuted. 43
Defendants in Smith first contended that they need only prove both
prongs by a preponderance of the evidence, but the court of appeals
quickly concluded that the "clear evidence" language in Armstrong
means clear and convincing evidence.344 Defendants next contended
that the magistrate erred in concluding that they did not prove selective
prosecution because there was the possibility of future prosecutions, and
the court of appeals agreed that the possibility of future prosecutions
was not a sufficient basis for dismissing the claims. 45
The court then examined whether defendants presented enough
evidence to prove both prongs of their claim. 4' Defendants attempted

334. Id.
335. 231 F.3d at 806. For discussion of defendant's multiplicity claim see supra text
accompanying notes 310-23.
336. 231 F.3d at 806.
337. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
338. 231 F.3d at 807.
339. 517 U.S. at 464.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 465.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. 231 F.3d at 808.
345. Id. at 808-09.
346. Id. at 809.
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to prove the discriminatory effect prong by showing that similarly
situated whites were not prosecuted, and similarly situated blacks who
were politically allied with whites were not prosecuted. 347 The court
recognized the novelty of a selective prosecution claim based on members
of defendants' same race not being prosecuted because of their political
alliance with whites, but declined to decide if this was a valid basis for
a selective prosecution claim because even if it was, defendants failed to
meet their burden.3
The court defined "similarly situated person" as:
one who engaged in the same type of conduct, which means that the
comparator committed the same basic crime in substantially the same
manner as the defendant-so that any prosecution of that individual
would have the same deterrence value and would be related in the
same way to the Government's enforcement priorities and enforcement
plan-and against whom the evidence was as strong or stronger than
that against the defendant.349
Defendants failed to meet their burden because the individuals they
claimed were similarly situated had committed different voting crimes
than those committed by Smith and Tyree.35 ° The court went further,
closely examining the record to find if there were any individuals who
had committed the same type of crimes as Smith and Tyree.35 While
the court found some such individuals, they were not similarly situated
as to the number of crimes they committed, and the record did not reveal
the strength of the evidence against them.352
In addition to failing to meet prong one, defendants failed to establish
discriminatory intent.35 3 Defendants argue& that the decision to bring
the case in federal court was made to avoid a black jury, but the court
rejected this as lacking "even a shred of evidence."" 4 The court also
rejected defendants' contention that the district court's rejection of the
government's peremptory strike of one black venire member showed that
the prosecution was motivated by bias.355

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 809-10.
at 810.
at
at
at
at

811.
812.
812-13.
813.
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2. Continuance. In United States v. Bowe, 356 the court of appeals
upheld the district court's denial of a continuance. 35' Defendant was
extradited from the Bahamas and his trial was initially set for February
1, 1993. When his attorney withdrew, the trial was rescheduled for
June 1993, but defendant could not find a new attorney until May.
Therefore, the trial was rescheduled for November 1, 1993. Defendant
hired three attorneys, Rosemarie Robinson, David Rowe, and David
Markus, but only Robinson filed a notice of appearance. In August 1993,
Markus was arrested and entered drug rehabilitation. On September 7,
Markus called the prosecution asking her to relay to the court a request
for a continuance. A status conference was held on September 14, at
which Robinson and Rowe were present but not defendant. At the
conference the continuance was discussed. The court asked defendant's
attorney to file a formal motion. Robinson did so, and it contained
affidavits from Markus and defendant. The court denied the motion.358
The court of appeals began by addressing the standard of review,
which it held to be abuse of discretion. 3" Defendant argued that
based on Smith-Weik Machinery Corp. v. Murdock Machine & Engineering Co.,3"' when illness of counsel is the basis for the continuance,
there is an exception to the general rule that decisions on continuances
are within the judge's discretion. 361 The court rejected defendant's
argument because a closer evaluation of Smith-Weik revealed that the
court in Smith-Weik was really applying an abuse of discretion
standard.362
The court recognized as "undisputed that one aspect of the right to
counsel protected by the Due Process Clause is the defendant's right to
choose his or her attorney."31 3 However, that right is balanced against
"'the general interest in the prompt and efficient administration ofjustice,"' so that "[diefendants ... are only guaranteed 'a fair or reasonable
opportunity' to select the attorney of their choice."364 There were six
factors the court considered in determining if defendant's right was
impinged:

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

221 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1187-88.
Id. at 1189.
423 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1970).
221 F.3d at 1189.
Id. at 1189-90.
Id. at 1190.

364.

Id. (quoting Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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(1) the length of the delay, (2) whether the counsel who becomes
unavailable for trial has associates adequately prepared to try the case,
(3) whether other continuances have been requested and granted, (4)
the inconvenience to all involved in the trial, (5) whether the requested
365
continuance is for a legitimate reason, and (6) any unique factors.
In this case, the delay would have been long, defendant still had two
attorneys familiar with his case, and Markus entered rehabilitation two
months before the trial date, and even with the denial of the continuance
a month before the trial date, there was ample time to find additional
counsel.3" Therefore, the court concluded that, under the circumstances, defendant's attorneys had plenty of time to prepare and the district
court did not abuse its discretion.31 7 This probably was a fair result,
given that defendant had several attorneys.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct. The Eleventh Circuit confronted
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in two cases during the survey
period. In Cordoba-Mosquera, discussed above in connection with a
Batson issue, the court of appeals once again faced the issue of improper
remarks by the prosecutor during a jury trial.3" The court upheld the
district court's denial of defendants' new trial motion based on the
prosecution's closing argument.36 9 The court began by stating the
standard applied to challenges based on prosecutorial misconduct:
"'Prosecutorial misconduct is a basis for reversing an appellant's
conviction only if, in the context of the entire trial and in light of any
curative instruction, the misconduct may have prejudiced the substantial
rights of the accused."'37 ° In addition, the court recognized that it
"gives 'considerable weight to the district court's assessment of the
prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks and conduct.'" 3 7 ' Here,
defendants challenged several remarks by the prosecutor during closing
arguments that referred to defendants' failure to explain certain
things.372 The district court instructed the jury to disregard the
comments, stated that the comments were "totally improper," stressed
that the prosecutor had the burden of proof, and asked the jurors

365. Id.
366. Id. at 1190-91.
367. Id. at 1191.
368. 212 F.3d at 1198. For discussion of defendants' Batson claim see supra text
accompanying notes 327-34.
369. Id.

370. Id. (quoting United States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir. 1989)).
371. Id. (quoting United States v. Herring, 955 F.2d 703, 710 (11th Cir. 1992)).

372. Id.
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individually if they could disregard the comments.373 The court of
appeals held that the court could best determine the effect of the
comments and how helpful the curative instruction was; therefore,
defendants failed to show that their substantial rights were affected.374
This case reflects the ongoing struggle the courts face regarding how
to control improper arguments by the prosecutor. While it would be
contrary to notions of the efficient administration of criminal law to
grant a defendant a new trial when the errors did not affect the
outcome, if the errors are almost always deemed harmless, how can
prosecutorial misconduct be deterred? 35 As suggested two years ago
in this survey article, in addition to formal sanctions, the court could
identify by name the offending attorney and chastise that attorney in the
published opinion. 376 Although such public condemnation might prove
a strong incentive for prosecutors to keep their closing arguments well
within bounds, courts seldom employ this sort of sanction.
What might have been a routine affirmance, United States v.
Campbell,377 turned into a heated debate between a dissenting judge
and a panel majority over what actions constitute misconduct, illustrating the point that there can be widely differing views as to what is
misconduct under the flexible contours of the Due Process Clause.37
The court of appeals addressed whether is was error to admit a Customs
agent's hearsay opinion that was contained in defendant's written
statement.37 9 Defendant flew from Jamaica to Miami, and when he
went through Customs, one of his suitcases was searched. The Customs
agent found two packages of cocaine in defendant's bag, and arrested
defendant. Another Customs agent read defendant his Miranda rights,
and defendant signed a waiver, agreeing to make a statement. The
agent wrote defendant's statement for him, in the third person.3"' In
addition to including defendant's comment that no one put anything in
his luggage, the agent "inserted his personal opinion in the statement,
commenting that he had told [defendant] that 'nobody gives this amount
of cocaine to someone they don't trust.'"3"' After reading the statement
and having a few additions made, defendant signed the statement. At
trial, the primary issue was whether defendant knew about the cocaine

373.
374.
375.

Id.
Id. at 1198-99.
See Fleissner & Harris, supra note 12, at 954.

376. Id.
377.
378.
379.
380.

223 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1290, 1295-96 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1287.

381. Id.
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in his bag prior to the search. While the agent who wrote out defendant's statement testified, the government had the agent read the whole
statement. The government then commented on the hearsay statement
three times during the agent's testimony and again during closing
arguments.8 2
The court of appeals applied the plain error standard because
defendant did not object at trial. 8 3 Under the plain error standard,
defendant had to prove "(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that
affects substantial rights."38 ' To affect substantial rights, the error
"'must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.'" 38 5
The court of appeals concluded that defendant failed to prove any of the
three prongs of the plain error standard.386 First, the court would not
recognize as error the trial court's failure to sua sponte redact defendant's statement.3 7 Second, even if it was error, the court concluded
that it was not plain because defendant cited no authority for the
premise that it was an error for the trial court to fail to sua sponte
redact the statement.3 8 Finally, the court concluded that even if it
was error and it was plain, it did not affect defendant's substantial
rights because (1) the "agent testified and was cross-examined"; (2) the
"agent could have stated the same opinion as an expert witness"; and (3)
the other evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude defendant had
knowledge.38 9
The most interesting part of this case was the scathing dissent written
by Judge Godbold. He began by stating, "The government cannot be
proud of this conviction."3" According to the dissent, the misconduct
by the government denied defendant due process, and the misconduct
consisted of a government agent "manufactur[ing] evidence tending to
show defendant's guilt ... [and] the government, with notice that the

evidence was manufactured, utilized it repeatedly to strike at the heart
of defendant's defense."" l Judge Godbold then took the majority to
task for its failure to "adequately treat an error of constitutional
dimension. It minimizes the governmental misconduct. It does not

382.

Id. at 1287-88.

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 1288.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).
Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1290 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
Id.
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recognize that government manufacture of evidence plus subsequent use
of it at trial with knowledge of its taintis a constitutional wrong."392
The dissent would have held that the manufacture of incriminating
evidence by the government and its subsequent use at trial, which
knows it to be tainted, is a constitutional error not subject to the
harmless error rule.393 In other words, it would be reversible error per
se. 394 Even if the harmless error rule applied, a constitutional error
must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.395 The dissent then
applied five factors from United States v. Mills 3 to conclude that the
error was not harmless:
(1) How important was the witness' testimony to the prosecution's
case? It was vital. (2) Was other testimony cumulative? No. (3) Was
there corroborating evidence to the testimony in question? No. (4)
What was the extent of cross-examination? Minimal or none on the
subject matter. (5) What was the overall strength of the prosecution's
case? Very thin. 397
The dissent concluded that it was the prosecution's duty not to use
evidence known to be manufactured, and the trial court should be alert
to ensure that manufactured evidence is399not used.398 Judge Godbold
concluded by calling this "a shabby case."
4. Burden of Proof. The court of appeals, in United States v.
Deleveaux, 40 addressed whether a justification defense to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), 40 1 the felony-in-possession statute, is available and, if so,
who has the burden of persuasion on it. 4°2 The government and
defendant stipulated to defendant being a convicted felon and to the
pistol being a firearm in or affecting commerce, and it was undisputed
that defendant took the pistol out of his attic crawl space, fired it and
returned it to the crawl space. Defendant claimed that he possessed the

392. Id. at 1294.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id.
Id.
Id.
138 F.3d 928 (11th Cir. 1998).

397. 223 F.3d at 1295 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
398. Id. at 1296.
399. Id.
400. 205 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000).

401.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). In relevant part, Section 922(g)(1) provides, "It shall

be unlawful for any person-(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ... possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm." Id.
402. 205 F.3d at 1296.
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pistol to protect himself and his family from a threat of death or serious
bodily injury, and therefore, he was justified. The government and
defendant presented conflicting evidence as to who started the altercation. Defendant claimed that his neighbor shot first, while the
government's evidence showed that defendant fired first.4 °3 The
district court determined that justification is an affirmative defense and
instructed the jury that defendant bore the burden of proof.4 4 Defendant was found guilty.4 5
The court of appeals "reviews de novo whether the district court
misstated the law when instructing the jury or misled the jury to the
prejudice of the defendant."40 6 The court of appeals began by following
other circuits to hold that justification may be available as a defense to
Section 922(g)(1), 4 7 but only in extraordinary circumstances. 40 8

The court then stated the elements of the defense as follows:
(1)that the defendant was under unlawful and present, imminent, and
impending threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that the
defendant did not negligently or recklessly place himself in a situation
where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) that the
defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; and
the criminal
(4) that there was a direct causal relationship between
4
action and the avoidance of the threatened harm. 11
To determine whether justification is an affirmative defense, the court
examined the elements of Section 922(g)(1), which are (1) the defendant
was a convicted felon; (2) the defendant "was in knowing possession of
a firearm; and (3) ...

the firearm was in or affecting interstate

commerce." 40 It concluded that justification is an affirmative defense
because it does not negate any element of Section 922(g)(1), but rather
is a legal excuse based on facts and circumstances distinct from the
elements of the crime.41 In doing so, the court rejected defendant's
argument that "knowingly" for purposes of Section 922(g)(1) means

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
United

Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1297 (citing United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 541 (3rd Cir. 1991);
States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gomez, 92

F.2d 770, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1996)).
408. Id. (citing Paolello, 951 F.2d at 542; Singleton, 902 F.2d at 472; United States v.
Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir. 1996)).
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1297-98.
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possessing the pistol with the intent to break the law.4 12 The prosecution is only required to prove that defendant knew the pistol was a
firearm to show that defendant acted knowingly; therefore, "[Section]
922(g)(1)41 3has no mens rea requirement for the justification defense to
negate."
The court then examined whether it was proper to put the burden
upon defendant.414 Defendant has a due process right to have the
prosecutor prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt;
therefore, the burden of proving or disproving an element cannot be
shifted to defendant. If defendant asserts a defense that negates an
element of the offense, the prosecutor must bear the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, but if the defense is an
affirmative defense that does not negate an element, defendant can be
required to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.41 The court
rejected defendant's argument that "federal courts generally require the
government to negate non-statutorily created defenses" because there are
well-established exceptions to that general requirement based on the
offense charged and the type of affirmative defense.4" In addition, the
court recognized a practical consideration in favor of placing the burden
on defendant: defendant is in the best position to get the evidence of
justification.417 .
While under Supreme Court precedent it is permissible to place the
burden of proof on a defendant for certain defenses,41 8 for most nonlawyers, and even some lawyers, it is suprising that any burden be placed
on a defendant. But the practice is now well entrenched and countenanced by the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence.
5. Apprendi Cases. In June 2000, the United States Supreme
Court issued an opinion in Apprendi v.New Jersey419 in which it held
that "[other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."4 20 The
issue left open by Apprendi, and the subject of much litigation, is
whether Apprendi should be read narrowly as only applying to the

412.
413.

Id. at 1298.
Id.

414. Id.
415. Id. at 1298-99.
416. Id. at 1300.
417.
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418. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
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setting of maximum penalties or whether it should be read broadly and
taken to its logical conclusion that all facts that increase a sentence
must be proved to a jury. As a result the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals heard several cases dealing with sentencing and what facts
should be submitted to the jury.
In United States v. Rogers,4 2' defendant was convicted under 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 422 for possession of cocaine base with the intent to
distribute. The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ("PSI") attributed
forty-one grams of cocaine base to defendant. Defendant objected to the
PSI because it attributed an amount of cocaine to him that was not in
the indictment or decided by the jury. The district court, at the
sentencing hearing, found that defendant possessed forty-one grams of
cocaine base and sentenced him accordingly.4 23 At the hearing,
defendant argued that he should be sentenced under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B), 424 not 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), 42" but the trial court
rejected that argument.42 s
The court of appeals began by recognizing that defendant should have
been sentenced under Section 841(b)(1)(B), but that the inquiry did not
end there because defendant's conviction had to be examined in light of
Apprendi.4 2' The court proceeded to examine the Supreme Court cases
The court concluded that the rule in
leading up to Apprendi.4'
Apprendi must be used when determining what the sentencing judge
may decide by a preponderance of the evidence, what must be included
in the indictment, and what the jury must decided beyond a reasonable
doubt. 429 The court concluded that a defendant cannot be "sentenced
to a greater sentence than the statutory maximum based upon the
quantity of drugs, if such quantity is determined by the sentencing judge

421. 228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000).
422. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
423. 228 F.3d at 1319-21.
424. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). "[Slection 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)
governs quantities of cocaine base containing '5 grams or more.' The term of imprisonment
dictated by section 841(b)(1)(B) is five years to forty years. If there is a prior felony drug
conviction, however, the sentence increases to ten years to life." 228 F.3d at 1321 n.7
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(BXiii)).
425. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). "Section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) covers
quantities of cocaine base containing '50 grams or more.' Section 841(b)(1)(A) sets the term
of imprisonment at ten years to life, but if there is a prior felony drug conviction, the
sentence is twenty years to life." 228 F.3d at 1321 n.7 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)
(iii)).
426, 228 F.3d at 1321.
427. Id. at 1321-22.
428. Id. at 1322-26.

429. Id. at 1326.
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rather than the trial jury," and that the statutory maximum is
determined without reference to the quantity.430

In short, the "drug

quantity in section 841(b)(1)(A) and section 841(b)(1)(B) cases must be
charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt" in order for the sentence to comport with Apprendi.431 Because
defendant was convicted without reference to the quantity of drugs, he
can "only be sentenced under section 841(b)(1)(C), which provides
punishment for conviction of an undetermined amount of crack
cocaine." 412 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit applied the basic holding
of Apprendi: If a finding of fact results in the increase in the maximum
penalty, then those facts must found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 43 Because the federal drug statute hinges the maximum
penalty on the amount of drugs possessed, Apprendi requires that the
amount43of
drugs be found by the factfinder like an element of the
4
offense.

Having applied Apprendi to the federal drug statute, the Eleventh
Circuit addressed several other issues raised in post-Apprendi litigation.
In these decisions, the claims based on Apprendi met with limited
success. In United States v. Nealy,435 defendant challenged his sentence for possession of cocaine base with the intent to distribute based
on the fact that the quantity of drugs was not submitted to the jury. At
his trial, Nealy requested that the jury be instructed regarding drug
quantity.436 The court of appeals reviewed defendant's Apprendi claim

de novo. 4 7 The court concluded that under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),
which provides the terms of imprisonment for undermined quantities of
drugs, the maximum sentence available for defendant was thirty years
because he had a prior drug felony conviction.4 38 Defendant was
sentenced to thirty-two years; therefore, the district court erred.439
However, the court of appeals held that Apprendi did not create a
structural error so that the error did not require per se reversal.44 °
Instead, the court of appeals applied the harmless error standard, which
is that "a constitutional error is harmless if '[it is] clear beyond a
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435. 232 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2000).
436. See id. at 828.
437. Id. at 829.
438. Id.

439. Id.
440.

Id.

20011

CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL

1355

reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant
guilty absent the error.'"' 1 Therefore, the court would only reverse if
it found evidence in the record "that could rationally lead to a contrary
finding with respect to drug quantity."" 2 Defendant was convicted for
drugs he possessed when the police searched his home and found 14.8
grams of cocaine base. At trial and sentencing, the amount was
uncontested; therefore, the court concluded that a rational jury could not
have convicted defendant of possession and found that he possessed less
than five grams, which is the amount necessary for the increased
statutory maximum of life.443
In United States v. Gerrow,4" defendants failed to raise at the trial
level the issues of not including the drug quantity in the indictment and
not submitting the drug quantity to the jury.445 Therefore, the court
of appeals applied the plain error standard and held that "there is no
error, plain or otherwise, under Apprendi where the term of imprisonment is within the statutory maximum set forth in § 841(b)(1)(C) for a
cocaine offense without regard to drug quantity."446 And, in United
44 7
the court of appeals refused to reverse a sentence
States v. Shepard,
that fell within the statutory maximum authorized by section 841(b)(1)(C) even though the district court applied section 841(b)(1)(B) in
violation of Apprendi.4 "
In United States v. Swatzie, 449 the court faced a situation similar to
Rogers. Defendant challenged his life sentence on the ground that the
jury did not determine the amount or the kind of drugs he possessed, he
was sentenced for possessing both cocaine base and powder, and the
amount and kind of drugs were elements of the crime and should have
been in the indictment.45
Because defendant did not object to the
indictment or to the jury instructions in a timely manner, the court
reviewed his case for plain error.45 ' In order for the court to reverse
based on a error not raised at trial, "'there must be (1) error, (2) that is

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).
Id. at 830.
Id.
232 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.
235 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1297.
228 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1281.
Id.

1356

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights."'452 Even if those three
requirements are met, the court need not notice the error if it does not
"seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings."453
Even though defendant was sentenced prior to
Apprendi and the issue of the sufficiency of the indictment was not
addressed in Apprendi, the court assumed that failing to include the
quantity and kind of drugs in the indictment and failing to submit it to
the jury was error and it was plain.4"4 However, the court proceeded
to find that the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights
because there was no serious dispute that defendant possessed at least
five grams of cocaine base, which was enough for the increased statutory
maximum, and no reasonable jury would have found him guilty and not
found that he possessed both cocaine powder and base.455 With regard
to the sufficiency of the indictment, defendant was provided with notice
before the trial, and defendant did not argue that he did not know that
the quantity and type of drugs would affect his sentence.45 Finally,
the court concluded that because the evidence against defendant was
overwhelming, the error did not "seriously affect the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings."4 5 v
The court of appeals established an important principle in In re
Joshua.45
Defendant sought an order that would authorize the
district court to consider his second habeas corpus petition.45 s Defendant could only get such an order if his second motion relied "on a new
rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral
review."6 0 Defendant claimed that Apprendi was such a rule.461
The court of appeals held that Apprendi did not apply retroactively to a
case on collateral review because the Supreme Court did not declare that
it so applied.46 2 "For a new rule to be retroactive, the Supreme Court
must make it retroactive to cases on collateral review."463 Moreover,
even if it was enough that the Court established the new rule on a

452. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)) (alteration in
original).
453. Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467) (internal quotation marks omitted).
454. Id. at 1281-82.
455. Id. at 1282-83.
456. Id. at 1283.
457. Id. at 1284 (internal quotation marks omitted).
458. 224 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2000).
459. Id. at 1281.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 1282.
462. Id. at 1283.
463. Id.
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collateral appeal for the rule to apply retroactively to collateral review,
the Court heard Apprendi on direct appeal, not collateral appeal.4"
Therefore,
Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
46 5
review.
Finally, in United States v. Pounds 66 the court of appeals addressed
whether Apprendi applied to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). 467 Defendant
and another individual robbed a Checkers in Atlanta, Georgia. During
the robbery, defendant's accomplice fired several shots. Defendant
pleaded guilty to robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a
violent crime. The district court sentenced defendant under section
924(c)(1)(A)(iii) because the firearm was discharged during the crime,
concluding that discharging the firearm was a sentencing factor, not an
element of the offense. The discharge of the firearm was not in the
indictment, nor was it submitted to the jury, and defendant contended
that this violated Apprendi.4 Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any
person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or
carries a firearm.., shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such crime of violence...
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.6 9
The court concluded that Apprendi was inapplicable because Section
924(c)(1)(A) has a statutory maximum sentence of life regardless of
which subsection a defendant is sentenced under. 47
"The discharge
of a firearm does not increase the maximum possible penalty of life
under [Section] 924(c)(1)(A);
rather, it increases only the mandatory
4 71
minimum penalty."
The theme of the preceeding cases is that the Eleventh Circuit will
construe Apprendi narrowly, using the plain and harmless error

standards as well as denying retroactive application of Apprendi to

464. Id.
465. Id.
466. 230 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2000).

467. Id. at 1319; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1999).

468. 230 F.3d at 1318-19.
469. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
470. 230 F.3d at 1319.
471. Id.
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collateral appeals to uphold sentences imposed in violation of Apprendi.
Most critically, as the comparison of Rogers and Pound suggest, the
Eleventh Circuit is narrowly construing the holding in Apprendi:
Apprendi addresses the situation in which the statutory scheme
increases the maximum penalty when certain facts are found. If a
factual finding merely affects the setting of the sentence within the
statutory maximum, Apprendi allows the facts to be found by a
sentencing judge on a preponderance of the evidence standard. This
narrow reading of Apprendi is subject to the criticism that the right to
a jury determination of critical facts will depend on the whim of the
statute's draftsmen. For example, the federal drug statue could be
rewritten to allow for a maximum sentence of life, and the judge would
then be allowed to set the sentence at the various levels based on the
judge's factual findings as to drug amount. One answer to this criticism
is that a broader reading of Apprendi, requiring facts that affect the
length of defendant's sentence to be found by the trier of fact using a
preponderance standard and without being limited by the rules of
evidence, would signal an end to the Supreme Court's longstanding
tradition of holding that judges are free to consider all probative
evidence in determining sentence. The broad reading ofApprendi would
bring a revolution in sentencing, including the demise of guideline
sentencing systems. The Eleventh Circuit has taken the narrower view,
under which Apprendi will not mean fundamental change. What is
more, the Eleventh Circuit is construing the harmless error and plain
error doctrines to limit the viability of Apprendi claims, thus quelling
any hope held by prisoners that Apprendi will give them a chance for
new, shorter sentences.
IV.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.472

472.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The Right to Counsel

In Jones v. United States,473 the Eleventh Circuit held that failing
to argue for a suppression of wiretap evidence when the evidence was
not immediately sealed under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) fell below an
"objective standard of reasonableness."4 7'
Defendant was under
investigation by the government, which obtained a valid wiretap in July
1988. Defendant later was arrested on drug charges. The tapes of the
recorded conversations were not sealed for at least thirty-one days.475
Under the law at the time defendant was arrested and went to trial,
challenging the introduction of evidence at trial based on improper
sealing under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) required the defendant to prove 4he
76
was prejudiced or "the integrity of the recordings was disturbed."
Defendant's counsel elected not to argue for the suppression of the
evidence at trial.4 77 However, the Eleventh Circuit noted that prior to
defendant's trial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether it is necessary to show prejudice to the defendant when there
has been improper sealing under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a).47 s Defendant's counsel moved to suppress evidence a month after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari but did not mention improper sealing as a
ground. The motion was denied and the tapes were admitted at
defendant's trial. Defendant was convicted and counsel filed a notice of
appeal. 47 9 The same day the notice of appeal was filed, the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Ojeda-Rios.4" In Rios the Supreme
Court held that defendant did not have to show prejudice under 18
U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) to succeed on a motion to suppress based upon
delayed sealing.4"' Applying the Supreme Court's holding to Jones, the
government would be required to show either "prompt sealing of tapes
or a reasonable excuse for not doing so" in order to use the tapes at
trial. 4 2
Defendant's attorney never mentioned this issue on the
appeal.4 3

473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.

224 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1253 n.4 (citing United States v. Diadone, 568 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1977)).
Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1253-54.
Id. at 1254.
495 U.S. 257 (1990).
Id. at 264-65.
224 F.3d at 1254 n.7.
Id. at 1254.
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Defendant then filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging ineffective
The Eleventh Circuit expanded defendant's
assistance of counsel.'
certificate of appealability in order to hear this issue on appeal.4"" The
court articulated the now familiar standard from Strickland v.Washington 4m that must be met before a defendant can succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.4 87 Defendant must "show that his
counsel was deficient" in that "[the] representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness," and prejudice as a result of this
deficiency." s The court reasoned that when the law in this circuit did
not favor suppression and was unsettled while the case was ongoing, it
was not unreasonable for the attorney to elect not to argue to suppress
the evidence.4 9 However, the court emphasized that circumstances
changed drastically.49 The Supreme Court's decision made the law
clear and applicable retroactively to those cases still pending on direct
appeal. 49 ' The court reasoned that defendant's attorney had not even
written the brief for the appeal when the decision was announced;
further, there was no mention of it to the court on appeal. 492 Because
of this, the court concluded that defendant's attorney's failure to argue
for suppression fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness."49 3
The court remanded the case so the district court could determine
whether the error prejudiced defendant's trial.494 The court noted that
"[i]f the wiretap evidence was crucial to [defendant's] conviction, the
district court must then determine whether the government had a
'satisfactory explanation' for the thirty-one day delay."49
If the

484. Id.
485. Id. Ordinarily, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
the appellate court is limited in its review to the issues "specified in the [Certificate of

Appealability]." Id. The court permitted defendant to expand his Certificate of
Appealability because he properly requested expansion by express motion and further
because "he ...made a substantial showing that he was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 1256.
486. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
487. 224 F.3d at 1257.
488. Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,363 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
489. Id. at 1258.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. The court also noted parenthetically that "when [the] Supreme Court applies
[a] rule of federal law, that rule 'must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open
on direct review'" Id. (quoting Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97
(1993)).
493. Id.
494. Id. at 1258-59.
495. Id. at 1259 (citing Ojeda-Rios, 495 U.S. at 265).
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government cannot show such an explanation, the court explained,
defendant is entitled to relief.49
The Eleventh Circuit examined another case involving the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Helton v. Secretary for the Depart497
ment of Corrections,
the court held that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed the grant of writ of habeas
corpus.4 " Defendant was convicted of second degree murder in the
death of a child. The case was based solely on circumstantial evidence.
The twenty-two month old child was found lying outside the home at the
bottom of the steps. The case originally had been overturned only to be
reinstated on rehearing by a Florida appellate court. Defendant then
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
federal district court. The district court, after an evidentiary hearing,
granted defendant's motion in spite of defendant's failure to satisfy the
statute of limitations for the writ.499 The Eleventh Circuit then
affirmed. °°
The Eleventh Circuit began by examining the tolling of the statute of
limitations.50' The court examined precedent and held that "[tihe
period of limitations ... may be equitably tolled 'when a movant
untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both
beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.'" 50 2 In this
case, defendant argued that his attorney was to blame for missing the
deadline to file the petition. 03 While the court noted that ordinarily
this would not be sufficient to equitably toll the statute of limitations,
this case was different and several other facts were involved which
warranted the tolling.0 4 One of these additional facts consisted of the
inadequacy of the prison library to enable defendant to discover the

496. Id.
497. 233 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2000).
498. Id. at 1327.
499. Id. at 1324. The district court granted the writ finding specifically
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the time of death and
present the gastric evidence. As to the issue of timeliness, the district court found
that equitable tolling was warranted in this case based on: 1) the petitioner's
diligent pursuit of his legal rights on appeal; 2) the misinformation by Helton's
counsel as to the expiration of the statute of limitations; 3) the inadequacy of the

prison library; and 4) the "strange history of this case."
Id.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id. (quoting Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000).
503. Id.
504. Id. at 1325.
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information concerning the statute of limitations himself.0 5 Further,
the court noted that under Supreme Court precedent, whether or not
defendant has "actively pursued his legal remedies" is an appropriate
consideration."' Finally, the court considered as an additional factor
in determining whether to equitably toll the statute of limitations the
history of the case in the lower courts." 7 A Florida appellate court
originally reversed defendant's sentence but then vacated that opinion. 508 Even after the opinion was vacated, one judge dissented and
felt that evidence not presented at trial would have resulted in a
different verdict.50 9
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the analysis necessary when
federal law has been applied at the state level.51 The court began by
articulating the familiar standard from Strickland for claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel: "petitioner must ...demonstrate that
counsel's performance was deficient, falling below a constitutional
minimum standard ....
[and] a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different."5 1'
The court then examined the standard from Neelley v.Nagle5. 2 requiring deference to state court decisions on the merits later adjudicated on
a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 513 The court noted that the
standard is explicit in the statute as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim.., resulted in
a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.1 4

505. Id.
506. Id. (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)).
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. In the Florida appellate court, the dissenting judge stated "that he would
reverse the conviction and award a new trial, based largely on the gastric evidence. That
jurist concluded, 'There can be no doubt that this evidence might have affected the verdict
rendered.'" Id. at 1324 (quoting Helton v. State of Florida, 641 So. 2d 146, 156 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (Nesbitt, J., dissenting)).
510. Id. at 1327.
511. Id. at 1326.
512. 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1998).
513. 233 F.3d at 1326.

514. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp III 1997)).
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The Eleventh Circuit noted that under this standard, there is a threepart inquiry which must be met to grant relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. 5' 5 This inquiry begins by examining "whether the federal law
applicable to the petitioner's claim has been clearly established."'
The district court must then "determine whether the state court's
adjudication of the claim was contrary to the established federal
law."517 Finally, the district court must examine "the objective ...
reasonableness of the state court's decision.""' The court found under
the first prong that the law applicable to cases of ineffective assistance
of counsel has been clearly established for some time; therefore, this
prong was certainly met.519 As to the second prong, because there
were no written opinions at the state level, the Eleventh Circuit found
that "it was justified in finding and concluding that federal law was
ignored in the state level review."52 ° Beyond this, the Eleventh Circuit
found no error by the21 district court in finding the decision by the state
court unreasonable.

The court then examined the substantive issue presented in the
petition-the ineffective assistance of counsel allegation.5 22 Defendant
argued that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to
present at trial gastric evidence of the child's time of death. 523 The
court noted that the attorney was not an experienced defense attorney
and that the evidence "had the potential of being persuasive proof of
[defendant's] innocence."5 24 The court emphasized the impact of the
evidence in this case was great because the case was circumstantial and
this was physical evidence tending to negate defendant's guilt.525 The

court concluded that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel
and affirmed the grant of writ of habeas corpus. 26

515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Neelley, 138 F.3d at 924).
Id. (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 373-74 (2000)).
Id.
Id. at 1327.

521.
522.
523.
524.
525.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

526. Id.
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Confrontation Clause

In a recent edition of this survey, the Confrontation Clause and the socalled Bruton doctrine were explained as follows:
In general, the Supreme Court's modern Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence has produced a correspondence between the traditional
law of hearsay and the defendant's right to confront the witnesses
against him. If an out-of-court statement is offered for a nonhearsay
purpose, that is, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement, or if the out-of-court statement fits a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception, the Supreme Court has found the statements reliable
enough to pass muster under the Confrontation Clause. Despite the
general parallelism of the Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence
governing hearsay, lawyers practicing criminal law must pay attention
to confrontation issues ....
Perhaps the most prominent modern Confrontation Clause doctrine
is the so-called "Bruton doctrine," which holds that the admission of
A's confession to authorities implicating B, at a joint trial of A and B,
infringes of B's confrontation rights .... A's voluntary confession is

admissible against A as A's direct admission under the hearsay rules;
however, A's confession does not fall within a traditional hearsay
exception so as to be admissible against B .... In Bruton the

Supreme Court held that the jury could not be trusted to follow a jury
instruction limiting consideration of such a confession to A's guilt and
that the decision to offer A's confession would require separate trials
or other remedial measures to protect B's rights .... It is a bit odd to

speak of denying B's right to confront evidence that is not admissible
againstB, but the modern Bruton doctrine is based on the theory that
the jury will inevitably use A's statement against B, so admission of A's
statement in a joint trial compromises B's right to confrontation.627
In United States v. Doherty,52 the Eleventh Circuit addressed one
such Confrontation Clause issue. In Dougherty defendants were
convicted of charges ranging from conspiracy to defraud the IRS and
making false statements to the IRS to making false statements to a
grand jury. At trial, an agent testified to a statement made by
defendant Gaudet that inculpated defendant Doherty.52 The district

527. James P. Fleissner & Amy R. Reeder, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 51
MERCER L. REv. 1089, 1108-10 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
528. 233 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000).
529. Id. at 1277-79. The statement as read from the agent's notes consisted of the
following:
Gaudet stated that he would get his instructions on where to deliver the fuel from
Ray Young or Doherty; all paperwork would go to John Doherty; that Gaudet
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court ruled that the statement was not a Bruton statement because it
did not "directly inculpate the other co-defendants."53 ' The court
refused to redact the statement and allowed the testimony. However,
the entire testimony was later stricken from the record because of
alleged threats made by the agent against another witness at the trial.
While the court struck the agent's testimony during closing arguments,
it did not address this in the jury instructions.53 '
The Eleventh Circuit began the analysis of the Bruton issue by stating
the now familiar holding by the Supreme Court that the "admission of
a confession or statement by a non-testifying defendant which inculpates
a co-defendant violates the co-defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confront a witness." 5 32 The court held the statement in this case was
inculpatory against defendant Doherty and prejudicial.533 Specifically,
the court noted that in the statement, Doherty's co-defendant expressly
admitted that he knew his activities were illegal and that he was
following Doherty's instructions in these matters. 34 The court further
held that the judge's instruction to consider the statement only against
the defendant to which it is attributed was not sufficient to alleviate the
prejudice in this case. 35
The court then went on to hold that the error was not harmless.536
First the court noted that a Bruton error can be considered harmless
only "if the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and

stated he knew what he was doing was illegal; that he stated he was followed for
about a week, Gaudet took this information to John Doherty.
Id. at 1279.
530. Id. at 1280.
531. Id. The actual trial testimony of the agent consisted of the following:
He [Gaudet] stated that he received instructions from-as to what to pull and
where to deliver-from Mr. Young and Mr. Doherty. He also stated that all the
paperwork from the fuel loads was given to Mr. Doherty and that he very rarely
ever saw Mr. Young. He said there came a time when he realized that what he
was doing was illegal, and that that occurred prior to the time that the Internal
Revenue Service executed a search warrant on Fuel Depot in October 1991. He
also advised that around the same time he realized that he was being followed
and he had told Mr. Doherty that he was being followed, and Mr. Doherty at the
time told him that Dry Tortuga Marina was under investigation by the Internal
Revenue Service.
Id. (alteration in original).
532. Id. at 1281 (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1968)).
533. Id. at 1282.
534. Id. at 1281-82.
535. Id. at 1282. Significantly, the only instructions the court gave were given during
the state's summation in which the judge told the jury the agent's testimony was stricken
from the record and was not to be considered. Id. at 1281.
536. Id. at 1282.
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the prejudicial effect of the co-defendant's statement [is] so insignificant,
that beyond any reasonable doubt the improper use of the statement was
harmless. " 3 ' Here, the court noted the circumstantial nature of the
case and the lack of any direct evidence other than the statement
itself.538 Because the evidence was so strongly circumstantial, the
court concluded that the statement likely had a significant impact on the
jury.5 3 9 The court also concluded that the error was not cured by
striking the agent's testimony.5 4 ° The court found that the decision to
strike was relayed to the jury during closing arguments and could not
have removed the taint of the testimony from the minds of the jury in
this way.54 ' Further, the government was permitted to allude to this
testimony in closing although it had been stricken.542 Finally, defendants were prevented from presenting evidence of the agent's threats
and therefore bias, which would have lessened the impact of the agent's
testimony on the jury.543 Therefore, the court concluded that the
admission of the testimony was not harmless error.5" Of course,
harmless error standard on direct appeal for constitutional error is that
the error be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a more rigorous
standard than is applied to evidentiary errors. This heightened
harmless error standard is a strong reason for counsel to couch hearsay
objections in Confrontation Clause terms as well as evidentiary terms if
at all possible.

537. Id.
538. Id. at 1283.
539. Id. at 1282-83.
540. Id. at 1283.
541. Id. The court quoted the Supreme Court with regard to evidence of a confession
and its impact on the jury, noting that '[sipecific testimony that 'the defendant helped me
commit the crime' is... difficult to thrust out of mind." Id. (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S.
at 208).
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.

